The media landscape has grown more diverse since the 2011 revolution. But the economic crisis has undermined the independence of many newsrooms, which are subject to political and economic interests. Since 2021, supporters of President Kaïs Saïed have dominated the media, imposing a narrative that favours the President. Pressure is intensifying on dissenting media outlets to conform to the official narrative, usually through media suspensions. While coverage of political issues has been significantly reduced across almost all media outlets, the radio station Diwan FM has managed to maintain a balanced, critical approach to the political news cycle. Podcasts and debates offered by Alqatiba, Rachma and Nawaat are gaining popularity, and the French-language news site Business News is also establishing itself as an alternative in an increasingly constrained media landscape. Television is the most popular medium in Tunisia, especially the public TV channels Al Wataniya 1 and 2. Radio comes next, with Mosaïque FM as the leading station. Online outlets have an avid following, but print media is losing ground. 

The political crisis shaking the country, and Saied’s uncertain commitment to press freedom, have had major repercussions. Since coming to power in October 2019, the Carthage presidential palace no longer receives journalists, despite protests from the National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT). Since 2021, the media landscape has been dominated by a uniform narrative favourable to the president, despite resistance from certain outlets. In both 2024 and 2025, the President of the Republic went so far as to summon public media outlets and urge them to join what he called the "war of national liberation" by focusing on civic issues according to his narrative.

The new constitution of July 2022, which gives the president broad legislative powers to the detriment of the checks and balances that had existed until then, has jeopardised the separation of powers and poses a major threat to the Tunisian revolution’s achievements in terms of press freedom. The independence of the judiciary has also been weakened, raising fears that when the courts are called on to rule on new restrictions, their rulings will serve political interests under the guise of supposed security imperatives. The courts persist in ruling on the basis of laws left over from the Ben Ali era, rather than relying on the 2011 decree laws, which are more favourable to press freedom. The deterioration of the political environment continues with Decree-Law 54 of September 2022, which is meant to combat “fake news” but poses a new major threat to press freedom. 

The media depends on private sector advertisers, including some who have shares in the media and ties with political figures — a situation that undermines editorial independence. Advertising revenue is linked to audience size, and the way this is calculated is poorly regulated and highly contested. The print media’s economic model, based on subscriptions, advertising and sales, is losing momentum, as sales are declining and the advertising market is shrinking. The lack of sustainable economic solutions has also prompted several private channels to resort to broadcasting content largely geared towards sales, to the detriment of news coverage.

The president’s supporters often use social media to conduct disinformation campaigns, discredit the press and instil distrust and confusion among voters. Verbal attacks on the media by politicians have increased in recent years.

Attempts to intimidate journalists are now commonplace. The harassment of journalists has become commonplace in Tunisia, a country where media professionals are arrested and prosecuted because of their work — and sometimes even for showing solidarity with fellow journalists. In 2024, a new record was set as over ten journalists were targeted by legal proceedings for simply doing their jobs, such as journalist Mourad Zaghidi, who has been behind bars since 11 May 2024.