2026 Iran war

The 2026 Iran war is an ongoing conflict that began on 28 February 2026 between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran together with Axis of Resistance partners on the other.^[1][2] It was preceded by the Twelve-Day War,^[3] unsuccessful talks on Iran's nuclear programme,^[4] and continued clashes arising from the Israel–Hamas war. The legality of the initial U.S. and Israeli strikes under the UN Charter has been disputed.^[5][6] The war remains unresolved as of 14 October 2026.^[1] Opening U.S. and Israeli airstrikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and struck military, governmental and nuclear sites.^[2] Iran retaliated with missile and drone attacks on U.S., Israeli and Gulf installations and restricted the Strait of Hormuz.^[7] The United States imposed a naval blockade of Iranian maritime traffic^[8] and in August launched Operation Economic Outcast.^[9] Fighting spread to Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Persian Gulf,^[10] including Houthi seizures affecting the Bab al-Mandab Strait.^[11] Diplomatic efforts failed to produce a settlement.^[12] Thousands of civilians and military personnel have been killed,^[13] and the International Energy Agency described the oil-supply disruption as the largest in history.^[14]

Names

The United States designated its campaign Operation Epic Fury.^[15] Israel designated its concurrent strikes Operation Roaring Lion, continuing the Rising Lion name used for the Twelve-Day War.^[16] Iran designated its retaliatory campaign Operation True Promise IV (Persian: عملیات وعده صادق ۴, romanized: Amaliyat-e Va'deh-ye Sadegh 4).^[17][18] American media have generally referred to the conflict as the Iran war. Some outlets have called it the Third Gulf War. Iranian state media has referred to it as the Third Imposed War. Because it began during Ramadan it has also been called the Ramadan War.^[19] The U.S. operation name was recast on social media as "Operation Epstein Fury," a formulation the Anti-Defamation League criticized.^[20] In August 2026, the United States began Operation Economic Outcast, branded Economic D-Day, a campaign of sanctions against Iran.^[9]

Background and prelude

Historical background (1951–1988)

In 1951 Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, with the support of Iran’s Parliament, nationalized Iran’s oil industry, triggering the Abadan Crisis and a British embargo.^[21] Two years of failed diplomatic negotiations among the United Kingdom, the United States and Iran followed, together with the United Kingdom v. Iran case at the International Court of Justice, which declined jurisdiction in 1952.^[22][23] In August 1953 the United Kingdom and the United States carried out Operation Ajax, a CIA–MI6 coup directed on the ground by Kermit Roosevelt Jr. that overthrew Mosaddegh. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi then consolidated autocratic, pro-Western rule, including alignment with Israel under the latter's periphery doctrine.^[24][25][26] Opposition to SAVAK repression and Westernization produced the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Islamic Republic was proclaimed, diplomatic ties with Israel were severed, and the 444-day embassy hostage crisis ended with the 1981 Algiers Accords.^{[27][28][29][30]} During the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War the United States backed Iraq. Operation Praying Mantis and the USS Vincennes downing of Iran Air Flight 655 (290 killed) followed. Sanctions and an obsolete air force led Iran to develop ballistic missiles and the Axis of Resistance, beginning with Hezbollah.^[31][32][33]

Nuclear program, JCPOA and maximum pressure (2002–2018)

Clandestine nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak were disclosed in 2002.^[34] Iran halted structured AMAD weapons work in 2003, citing a fatwa by Ali Khamenei.^[35][36] US and UN sanctions followed from 2005, along with the Stuxnet sabotage and Israeli assassinations of nuclear scientists.^[37] The 2015 JCPOA capped enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief; the United States withdrew in 2018 and pursued "maximum pressure," continued under subsequent administrations.^[38] Iran maintained large enriched stocks and technical capacity without weaponization, citing Israel's undeclared arsenal outside the NPT.^[39][40]

Escalations of 2020–2025 and the Twelve-Day War

The January 2020 US strike that killed Qasem Soleimani,^[41] the October 2023 Hamas attack and ensuing regional war, Israeli strikes on Iranian assets and assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah,^[42][43] and Iranian missile-and-drone barrages in 2024^[44] preceded Israel's June 2025 Operation Rising Lion (the Twelve-Day War),^[45] in which the United States also bombed Iranian nuclear sites before a fragile ceasefire.^[46]

2025–2026 crisis: IAEA finding, snapback, protests and military buildup

On 12 June 2025 the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran non-compliant with NPT safeguards, the first such ruling in two decades.^[47][48] Iran moved highly enriched uranium to an undamaged underground site and restricted inspectors.^[49] UN snapback sanctions in September 2025 produced hyperinflation;^[50][51] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called it maximum pressure's "grand culmination."^[52] Nationwide protests from late December 2025, the largest since 1979 and spanning more than 100 cities with calls for regime change (including from Reza Pahlavi), were met with live fire, heavy weapons and drones on 8–10 January 2026 under a prolonged internet blackout; Kurdish general strikes affected dozens of towns, with Abdanan and Malekshahi briefly seized. Death-toll estimates ranged from the official 3,117 to several tens of thousands.^[53][54] The United States then staged its largest Middle East deployment since 2003, including the carrier strike groups Abraham Lincoln and Gerald R. Ford. President Trump described it as an "armada" and indicated openness to regime change. The United Kingdom refused permission to use RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia for offensive strikes, citing international law; Trump publicly questioned the Chagos Islands arrangement.^[55] Iran dismissed the buildup as psychological warfare, raised alert levels, dispersed aircraft and conducted drills that disrupted Hormuz shipping. On 3 February IRGC gunboats approached the US-flagged tanker Stena Imperative in the Strait of Hormuz and an F-35C from the Abraham Lincoln shot down a Shahed-139 drone closing on the carrier; on 5 February the IRGC seized two tankers near Farsi Island, stating they were smuggling fuel.^[56][57][58]

Diplomatic talks, ultimatum and outbreak of hostilities

Omani-mediated talks were held in Muscat (6 February) and Geneva. US demands included dismantlement of enrichment, transfer of fissile material and missile limits. On 10–11 February Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pressed Trump for joint preemptive strikes, arguing missile capacity could be destroyed within weeks, Hormuz kept open and internal collapse triggered; similar requests had been declined by previous US administrations. Trump issued a roughly 10-day ultimatum around 20 February.^[59][60] Mid-February Iran notified the IAEA that inspections were "legally untenable and materially impracticable" under military threat, leaving about 460 kg of 60%-enriched uranium unmonitored; IAEA and US intelligence reported no resumed weaponization and no ICBM capability before 2035. Iran sharply increased oil loadings (nearly tripling weekly volumes from Kharg Island in mid-February) and discussed anti-ship systems with China.^[61] Trump's 24 February State of the Union claimed weapons work had resumed and ICBMs able to reach the US mainland were under construction, contradicting intelligence assessments and his earlier "obliterated" characterization.^[62] On 27 February Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi described a breakthrough in which Iran would permanently forgo weapons-grade enrichment, irreversibly downblend the 460 kg stock and restore full IAEA monitoring in exchange for sanctions relief and non-aggression guarantees, with signing envisaged for 2 March; envoy Steve Witkoff rejected residual enrichment rights, diplomats reported US hardliners had misrepresented Iranian concessions, and Trump authorized the strikes.^[63][64] On 28 February 2026, Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion opened mass air and missile strikes on Iranian military headquarters, air defenses, nuclear sites and leadership compounds. Combat continues as of October 2026.^[1]

Justifications and positions

United States (Operation Epic Fury)

Stated justifications for Operation Epic Fury included counter-proliferation, with an asserted “imminent” nuclear breakout after diplomacy failed following the 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA, which the administration blamed on Iranian deception and enrichment violations; delay, officials said, would leave buried sites unstrikesable.^[65] Force-protection concerns encompassed Iran’s missile and drone buildup, proxy networks (Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Houthis), detained Americans used as leverage, and threats to shipping, especially at Hormuz.^[65] The legal theory was anticipatory and continuing self-defence tracing hostilities to the 1979 hostage crisis, later framed by State Department Legal Adviser Reed Rubinstein as collective self-defence of Israel and US self-defence against “decades of Iranian aggression,” so that a fresh imminence assessment was unnecessary.^[66] Regime change was stated openly. In early March President Trump wrote there would be “no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER,” after which allies would help choose “GREAT & ACCEPTABLE Leader(s)”; no detailed post-war governance plan was published.^[67][68] Human-rights justifications referenced Iran’s January 2026 protest crackdowns; critics called this supplementary cover, noting Iran had offered verified downblending immediately before the strikes.^[69] The IAEA reported no structured program to build nuclear weapons currently.^[70] Analysts also cited implied motives of tilting regional power toward Israel and Gulf allies, securing energy flows, and ending Iran’s Hormuz leverage. Stated objectives were to incapacitate nuclear, missile and command capabilities, reopen Hormuz free of Iranian control or tolls, and force a capitulatory settlement through blockade and sanctions. Later statements included discussion of seizing Iranian oil and gas infrastructure.^[71]

Israel (Operation Roaring Lion)

Stated justifications included:

• Closing a strike window: intelligence that buried facilities and S-400/HQ-9 defences would make nuclear and missile sites bomb-proof “within months.” Netanyahu said the aim was to “remove the existential threat posed by the terrorist regime in Iran”; Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar warned delay would grant immunity.^[72][73]
• Missile and air-defence degradation: halt mass production of long-range ballistic missiles and shrink offensive reach.
• Proxy warfare: degrade Hezbollah and Houthi infrastructure after the 2024 confrontations and the Twelve-Day War, citing the 1994 AMIA bombing (an Argentine court held Iran and Hezbollah responsible in 2024), 2024 arson plots against Jewish sites, Shin Bet indictments in 2025 for IRGC/MOIS-directed espionage, and Iranian cyber operations.
• Pre-emptive self-defence: 47 years of Iranian hostility since 1979, including Khamenei’s threats to Israel’s existence. Defence Minister Israel Katz said Israel “launched a preemptive strike… to remove threats to the State of Israel.”
• Political change: Netanyahu cast the campaign as weakening the government so Iranians could “seize control of their destiny.”

Objectives were permanent dismantlement of nuclear facilities and deep-strike systems, killing of senior figures to shatter command and control, and severing of proxy supply lines. By September the military focus had shifted chiefly to Hezbollah, a southern Lebanese buffer and pressure for its disarmament.

Iran (Operation True Promise IV)

Iran invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, claiming self-defence against aggression launched during negotiations that violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as retaliation for the killing of the head of state and high command. It traced the war to the 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions, which it characterised as economic warfare and an attempt at regime change. Tehran asserted enrichment as a sovereign right under NPT Article IV and cited Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal outside the NPT as a double standard. Retaliatory strikes and measures in the Strait of Hormuz were framed as legitimate self-defence. Iranian media and officials used the label “Third Imposed War.”^[74][75] Stated objectives were regime survival via “mosaic defence” and deterrence; asymmetric retaliation (Hormuz closure, strikes on regional energy infrastructure) to impose economic cost and gain leverage; and no capitulation. In mid-March President Masoud Pezeshkian set terms: recognition of Iran’s legitimate rights, reparations, and firm international guarantees against future aggression.^[76] A Congressional Research Service product stated that Iran’s nuclear facilities did not appear to have been a primary target of 2026 US strikes (an April CENTCOM list of 13 target categories omitted them); IAEA safeguards had lapsed at facilities struck in 2025, leaving verification gaps.^[77]

Regional and external parties

Legal standing

Justifications divide a strategic reason to fight from a legal entitlement to use force. The US–Israel position treats security concerns as establishing necessity; the disputed step is whether they established imminence sufficient to make war lawful, given that strikes began during negotiations. In an April 2026 memorandum, State Department Legal Adviser Reed Rubinstein argued that Operation Epic Fury continued an existing international armed conflict in collective self-defence of Israel and in U.S. self-defence, so that a fresh imminence assessment was unnecessary.^[78] Numerous international-law scholars and professional bodies rejected that reading as incompatible with the UN Charter’s limits on self-defence. A letter signed by more than 100 U.S.-based experts and a statement by the New York City Bar Association concluded that the 28 February strikes lacked Security Council authorization and an adequately established armed attack or imminent threat; critics of the memorandum argued that an existing conflict is not a standing licence for force and that necessity and proportionality still apply.^{[75][79][80][81][82]} These conclusions are expert assessments, not court judgments. Iran’s claim of self-defence against an armed attack on its territory is the conventional Article 51 case against its attackers, yet does not licence strikes on civilians, commercial shipping or uninvolved states; every action remains subject to necessity, proportionality and humanitarian law. Lawful self-defence does not legalize indiscriminate attacks, and Iran’s domestic repression does not licence foreign regime-change warfare. The United Nations Secretary-General condemned the U.S.–Israeli strikes, citing the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state,^[4] while the Security Council passed Resolution 2817 condemning Iran's retaliatory strikes on Gulf states.^[83] A September 2026 report by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission found reasonable grounds to believe two U.S. airstrikes were war crimes; those findings are investigative, not criminal convictions.^[84] The United States did not obtain a declaration of war or a specific statutory authorization from Congress. The administration submitted a War Powers notification on 2 March 2026; the New York City Bar Association argued that the operation exceeded the President’s unilateral defensive authority under the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.^[82][85] The legality of Iran’s restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz and of the subsequent U.S. naval blockade of Iranian maritime traffic remains contested.^[86][87]

Impasse (late September 2026)

US demands included unrestricted Hormuz passage without Iranian control or tolls, plus nuclear constraints including disposition of highly enriched uranium.^[88] Iran’s seven-day proposal, conveyed via mediators around 25 September, called for an end to hostilities in Iran and Lebanon, lifting of the blockade, release of frozen assets and oil sanctions, then reopening of Hormuz and resumption of nuclear talks, with no concession on enrichment or shipping uranium abroad.^[89][90][91] Islamabad talks in April 2026 failed over Iran’s nuclear programme and access through the Strait of Hormuz.^[8] The 17 June Islamabad Memorandum traded a halt to direct strikes and restored shipping for sanctions relief and economic concessions while deferring those disputes;^[12] renewed attacks in July unravelled it, and the August 60-day deadline passed without a final deal.^[92] Immediate concessions had rested on unresolved nuclear, maritime and regional disagreements. Shuttle diplomacy resumed in late September. The core incompatibility remained that Washington and Israel sought security by limiting Iranian capabilities, while Tehran sought security by retaining leverage sufficient to deter another attack. Analysts described U.S. and Israeli military superiority as having inflicted severe damage on Iranian conventional capabilities without producing a decisive political outcome. Iran's survival and control of the Strait of Hormuz converted battlefield losses into bargaining power. Destroying capabilities has not equated to achieving political goals, and shipping disruptions have spread economic costs globally. Neither side has demonstrated a clear military route to victory, with diplomacy competing against the prospect of a prolonged stalemate. Claims of decisive victory or defeat remain interpretations rather than established conclusions.^[93][94][95]

Conduct of the war

The following chronology covers operations, ceasefires, and related events after 28 February 2026. As of early October a tentative operational pause holds, with continuing vessel interdictions along the Hormuz corridor; contemporaneous reporting stated that President Trump had told advisers he planned to resume strikes after the November U.S. midterm elections.^[96]

Course of the war

Senior Iranian officials killed

The opening wave included a decapitation strike that destroyed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's compound and killed him together with dozens of other officials, as well as attacks on military installations, government facilities, and nuclear sites.^{[126][127][128][129]} Iranian state media confirmed the death on 1 March 2026 and declared 40 days of mourning. Fars News Agency reported that Khamenei's daughter Boshra Khamenei, granddaughter Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani, son-in-law Mesbah Bagheri Kani and daughter-in-law Zahra Haddad-Adel were also killed. An Interim Leadership Council (President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei and Assembly of Experts member Alireza Arafi) assumed duties; Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed Supreme Leader on 8 March.^[130]

Strike footprint

Coalition strikes on Iran and allied theaters

• Tehran: Pasteur government district; Sa'dabad; Thar-Allah complex; police and municipal offices; IRIB state-media towers; Be'sat Stadium and national wrestling/tennis facilities; historic Rafi-Nia Synagogue destroyed.
• Nuclear/energy: Natanz (twice); Kharg Island; South Pars; Bushehr ammunition depot; Sanandaj.
• Levant/Iraq: Hezbollah command in Beirut (Dahieh), Nabatieh, Bekaa Valley; Jurf al-Sakhar (Popular Mobilization Forces).
• Civilian sites (errant): Minab school, Lamerd sports hall, Kuhestak wedding (figures above).

Iranian and Axis retaliation (Operation True Promise IV and proxy forces) Maritime: Tankers hit in the Gulf and at Bab al-Mandab: Skylight, MKD Vyom, Hercules Star, Safesea Vishnu, Mayuree Naree. Iran falsely claimed missile hits on the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.

Military Losses

As of late March 2026, Bloomberg and CENTCOM statements report that the US has lost at least 16 military aircraft in the conflict, with some reports indicating up to nearly 20 when including damaged platforms.

• Approximately 10-12 MQ-9 Reaper drones downed by Iranian defenses.
• 1 F-15E Strike Eagle downed by Iranian air defenses on April 3, 2026; the Weapons Systems Officer was successfully recovered alive during a CSAR mission concluding on April 5, 2026.
• 1 KC-135 tanker destroyed in a mid-air incident on March 12.
• An F-35A damaged by ground fire on March 19 requiring emergency landing.

U.S. Central Command has stated that no crewed fighter jets (F-15, F-35, F/A-18) were shot down in other incidents, addressing Iranian reports of such losses, including an F/A-18 over Chabahar on March 25. See also dedicated articles on specific incidents: 2026 Kuwait F-15 friendly fire incident, 2026 western Iraq KC-135 mid-air collision, March 2026 Iranian shoot-downs of U.S. and Israeli drones. Material and Equipment Losses Iranian losses (per US/Israeli assessments):

• Naval vessels: 140+ destroyed or damaged, including nearly all IRGC Navy combat ships and a submarine.
• Ballistic missile launchers: 190+ destroyed.
• Air defenses: Up to 85% of surface-to-air missiles degraded.
• Other: Significant damage to airbases, command nodes, and defense infrastructure.

US losses (primarily from Iranian missile and drone strikes on regional bases):

• Direct equipment: Early estimates ~$1.9–$2B in first 4 days, including high-value radars (e.g., AN/FPS-132 early warning at Al Udeid ~$1.1B damaged, THAAD AN/TPY-2 components).
• Aircraft: As listed above, plus 11-12 MQ-9 Reapers ($500M+ total).
• Infrastructure: ~$800M in base damages across 17+ sites.

Information warfare and media coverage

Information warfare was a significant dimension of the 2026 Iran war. Reporting restrictions, AI-fabricated imagery, entertainment-style official messaging, and genuine evidence wrongly dismissed as fabricated complicated independent verification. Restrictions imposed across several countries reduced the publicly available evidence base, although their scope and severity differed.^{[131][132][133]}

Access

In Iran, authorities imposed an internet blackout during protests on January 8, eased it in February, and instituted a new shutdown when US-Israeli strikes began on February 28. CPJ subsequently documented an 88-day near-total wartime blackout, with connectivity falling to about 1% of normal levels. Partial restoration in late May did not end surveillance, filtering, or reporting restrictions. RSF’s 2026 World Press Freedom Index ranked Iran 177th of 180 countries.^{[134][135][136]} Journalists reported editorial instructions from security officials, threatening calls, detentions, confiscated footage, and restricted access to damaged sites throughout the war, rather than in a single clearly established May crackdown. Foreign journalists required government permission and coordination for sensitive filming locations; available evidence does not establish a universal rooftop-only rule or blanket prohibition on street filming.^{[135][137][138]} Under an espionage law passed in 2025, cooperation with “hostile states” could carry the death penalty and asset confiscation. On March 31, a judiciary spokesperson warned that sharing imagery useful for enemy targeting could be treated as intelligence cooperation. CPJ also documented asset-seizure and bank-account-freeze orders affecting journalists associated with opposition outlets abroad.^[132][139] In the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, authorities restricted filming or sharing of attack and interception footage and arrested hundreds of people. Amnesty International documented more than 1,000 war-related expression arrests across Gulf states. Such restrictions obstructed public scrutiny; their effect on Iran’s battle-damage assessment was not established by these sources.^[132][140] On March 1, Israel’s military censor restricted live broadcasting during air-raid sirens, filming of interceptions or impacts near security sites, publication of exact civilian impact addresses, and reposting of footage without approval. CPJ separately documented journalists being obstructed or detained while reporting.^[132] In the United States, Pentagon restrictions limited journalists’ access, and still photographers were excluded from two March war briefings. AP documented administration pressure to frame coverage favourably. After a federal judge blocked parts of the Pentagon’s credentialing policy, the department announced further access restrictions and closure of its internal media offices.^{[141][142][143]} Planet Labs extended its Middle East satellite-imagery delay to 14 days in March and in April announced indefinite withholding of conflict-region imagery following a US government request, with case-by-case exceptions. These measures constrained independent damage assessment.^[144][145]

Messaging

Iranian state and pro-Iran accounts promoted narratives of military success, sometimes using exaggerated, misrepresented, or AI-generated visuals. Reuters documented a domestic propaganda campaign stressing national unity and resistance, while analysts questioned how convincingly it reflected public sentiment and economic conditions.^[146][147] Explosive Media, formerly Explosive News, produced viral AI-generated Lego-style animations mocking US and Israeli leaders, often with rap soundtracks; these were not established as physical Lego stop-motion productions. Iranian-government accounts amplified them, but the group’s institutional relationship with the state remained disputed and its spokesperson claimed independence. Iranian embassies, including those in South Africa and Ghana, also circulated memes attacking Trump and highlighting the Strait of Hormuz dispute.^[148][149] In an April 1 open letter, President Masoud Pezeshkian questioned whether the war served “America First,” denied hostility towards ordinary Americans, and accused Israel of drawing the United States into the conflict; these were his assertions, not independently established explanations of the war’s causes.^{[150][151][152]} Iranian state media framed the conflict as the “Ramadan War.”^[153] After Khamenei’s death, Grand Ayatollahs Naser Makarem Shirazi and Hossein Nouri Hamedani issued fatwas describing revenge against the United States and Israel as a religious duty for Muslims.^[154] IRGC statements later urged civilians in countries hosting U.S. forces to stay away from alleged off-base accommodations and to report those locations.^[155] NewsGuard’s tracker, updated September 25, recorded 160 distinct false claims with hundreds of millions of collective views. Claims in its database overwhelmingly favoured Iran, but only a handful originated with Iranian state media. That finding describes NewsGuard’s monitored dataset, not a comprehensive census of all wartime misinformation.^[133] US and Israeli officials emphasised military superiority and damage to Iranian capabilities; those assessments remain attributed, and Hegseth also acknowledged that some Iranian attacks could still reach their targets.^[156][157] The White House published stylised strike montages, including one featuring Trump, Hegseth, and Rubio audio over an updated version of John Lee Hooker’s “Boom Boom,” without casualty imagery. CENTCOM posted slowed explosions ending with an “Operation Epic Fury” logo; other official videos combined strikes with entertainment imagery.^[158] Trump and Hegseth attacked unfavourable reporting. On March 14, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr threatened broadcasters’ licences over alleged “hoaxes and news distortions.” AP and CPJ documented the threat; it was not an established finding that the criticised reporting was false.^{[132][142][159]} CAMERA reported 32 applications of “war crime” in coverage from February 28–March 21 across BBC, CNN, NBC, The New York Times, and The Washington Post, classifying 28 (about 88%) as referring solely to US or Israeli actions, none solely to Iran, and four as unattributed or referring to both sides. This was CAMERA’s own search-based advocacy analysis, not an independently replicated measure of overall coverage bias or legal responsibility.^[160]

Intelligence

The Wall Street Journal reported in mid-March that Mossad operatives telephoned Iranian security officials, threatened them, and urged them not to oppose potential uprisings. The report supports describing an alleged psychological-pressure operation; a circulated recording and claims about widespread defections were not independently authenticated.^[161] On March 9, ABC News reported a federal alert about encrypted transmissions believed to originate in Iran that might signal instructions to overseas “sleeper assets.” The assessment was preliminary: the contents were unknown, the alert identified no operational threat tied to a specific location, and it did not establish that sleeper cells had been activated.^[162]

Amplification

AP documented the Russia-aligned Operation Overload network, also known as Matryoshka or Storm-1679, impersonating intelligence agencies and news organisations. Unaffiliated opportunistic accounts also spread recycled footage, video-game clips, and AI-generated material. BBC Verify documented monetisation incentives and instances in which Grok incorrectly authenticated synthetic war videos.^[131][146]

Documented cases

• Bahrain, February 28–March 1. BBC Verify authenticated footage of Iranian attacks on Fifth Fleet headquarters on February 28. A fabricated damage image circulated by the state-linked Tehran Times appeared the following day. BBC published its investigation on March 7; that was not the attack date. Disproving the image did not disprove the attack.^[131]
• USS Abraham Lincoln, claims circulating by March 2. The cited video appeared online in June 2025, while the photograph dated to June 2013. CENTCOM denied an Iranian missile attack. The recycled visuals did not substantiate the claim.^[133]
• Burj Khalifa, documented by March 7. An AI-generated video falsely depicting the Dubai tower burning attracted tens of millions of views. March 7 was BBC Verify’s report date, not an established date of first circulation.^[131]
• Minab school, February 28. Verified imagery documented damage to the school and nearby military compound. Genuine burial-site imagery was subsequently misidentified by Grok and others as older footage from elsewhere. Separately, an AI-generated image purportedly showing parents burying victims also circulated. Authentic and fabricated material therefore existed around the same real attack and must be assessed individually.^{[163][164][165]}

An official claim, viral clip, and corroborated investigation are not interchangeable. Missing footage does not establish that an event never happened; genuine imagery can carry a false date, location, or explanation. Verification requires checking provenance and context as well as visual authenticity.^[131][133]

Reporting

CNN’s Frederik Pleitgen and his team entered Iran on March 5, becoming the first US television-network team to enter after the war began. They reported under government permission and filming coordination, including on bombardment and the absence of shelters and warning sirens. Reza Sayah, a former CNN correspondent, reported from Tehran as PBS NewsHour’s special correspondent.^{[138][166][167][168][169]} The New York Times’ Iran coverage involved Farnaz Fassihi, Erika Solomon, and Yeganeh Torbati; available reporting does not establish that all three reported from inside Iran. CPJ documented threats against Times of Israel correspondent Emanuel Fabian over his missile-strike reporting.^{[132][170][171]} Harvard’s spring 2026 Youth Poll found that 46% of Americans aged 18–29 regarded the US relationship with Israel as mostly a burden, compared with 16% who regarded it as mostly a benefit; the figures record respondents’ attitudes rather than a demonstrated shift of US coverage toward the midterms.^[172]

Internal Issues in Iran

The ongoing war has precipitated profound internal issues in Iran, characterized by leadership controversies, military defections and desertions, and a wave of arrests and executions aimed at suppressing dissent. In early March 2026, U.S. intelligence assessed that Iran's leadership remained largely intact and was not at risk of collapse.^[173]

Internet Blackout

Amid escalating internal issues and to suppress dissent, information leaks about military losses, and potential coordination of opposition activities, Iranian authorities imposed a near-total nationwide internet blackout starting February 28, 2026, coinciding with the initial US-Israeli strikes. Connectivity across the country dropped by over 98-99%, with national internet traffic reduced to as low as 1% of normal levels in the early days of the shutdown. This measure, one of the most severe and prolonged in Iran's history, was designed to control the domestic narrative, prevent the spread of anti-regime content or footage of strikes and casualties, and hinder organized protests or defections during the war. The government intensified restrictions on VPNs and targeted satellite-based internet services, including attempts to block Starlink terminals. Partial and intermittent access was reported in some areas by mid-March, but widespread disruptions persisted into April 2026. Reuters reported on April 28 that Iran had entered the third month of the internet blackout (which began 8 January, briefly eased in February, and was reimposed after the war started on 28 February), with authorities introducing limited access for some businesses under a temporary "Internet Pro" scheme that created a two-tier system. Some journalists were offered "white SIM cards" for freer international internet access, with the expectation of remaining within the state narrative.^[137] Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Access Now, and the Committee to Protect Journalists condemned the blackout as a grave violation of freedom of expression and access to information, exacerbating risks to civilians by limiting emergency communications and external reporting. Sources: NYT (March 18, 2026), HRW (March 6, 2026), Access Now, Middle East Eye, various reports (February-March 2026).

Military Defections and Desertions

At least 4,770 members of the IRGC, Basij, and police have been killed since the start of the war in attacks by Israel and the United States, Iran International has learned. The sources said 20,880 others have also been injured. Iran's military has faced growing morale issues due to sustained losses and logistical challenges. Western intelligence assessments and statements from defectors in March 2026 reported increased desertions, particularly among conscripted army units and lower-ranking IRGC personnel. Several high-profile defections occurred, including air force pilots who fled to neighboring countries with aircraft or knowledge of defenses. These incidents have reportedly degraded operational effectiveness and forced reliance on more loyal but strained elite units.

Arrests and Executions

To quell potential unrest and eliminate perceived threats, Iranian security apparatus intensified repression. Mass arrests targeted suspected dissidents, protesters, dual nationals, and those accused of ties to foreign intelligence. Official statements confirmed executions of individuals charged with espionage, sabotage, and "corruption on earth," with at least 20 reported in the second half of March 2026 alone, including the March 19 hangings of Saleh Mohammadi, Mehdi Ghasemi, and Saeed Davoudi, the first executions of January protest detainees.^[174] Human rights organizations documented allegations of torture, forced confessions, and summary proceedings. On 30 March, another two political prisoners, Akbar Daneshvarkar and Mohammad Taghavi Sangdehi, were executed by hanging.^[26] The next day, another two prisoners, Babak Alipour and Pouya Ghobadi, were hanged. By early May 2026, reports indicated the Iranian regime had accelerated executions of political prisoners amid the war, hanging at least 18 in six weeks. According to HRANA, 22 of 31 executions over 65 days involved political or security prisoners (71%, versus 7 of 191 in a comparable prior-year period), with at least 16 January 2026 protest detainees sentenced to death.^[175][176] These domestic challenges have strained Iran's war effort, contributing to logistical breakdowns and raising questions about long-term regime stability amid continued external pressure.

Belligerents and Operations

US and Israeli Forces

U.S. forces included the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf, long-range bombers, and, as of late March 2026, approximately 50,000 troops in the Middle East theater. Reinforcements included the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (approximately 2,200 Marines) embarked on USS Tripoli (LHA-7), other amphibious ready groups such as USS Boxer, and 3,000–4,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division for potential missions such as securing maritime routes. Destroyers used the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) system against Iranian drones and small threats, supplementing missile interceptors. Defensive operations against Iranian ballistic missile barrages depleted nearly half to over half of U.S. Patriot and THAAD interceptor stockpiles. Estimates suggest between 1,060 and 1,430 Patriot missiles were used out of a pre-war inventory of approximately 2,330, alongside significant THAAD usage.^{[177][178][179][180][181]} Replenishment could take years. In late April 2026, the commander of United States Forces Korea confirmed that the THAAD battery in South Korea had not been relocated, though some associated munitions were awaiting possible movement.^[182][183] Israeli forces used F-35 fighters and precision-guided munitions against Iran's ballistic-missile infrastructure and air defenses; the Israeli Air Force flew major sorties of about 200 fighter jets early in the conflict. Israel raised its reservist mobilization limit to 400,000 (from 280,000), covering operations including against Hezbollah in Lebanon. U.S. and Israeli commands shared real-time intelligence through joint task forces. Neither side committed large-scale ground troops inside Iran; operations remained predominantly air, missile, and naval, with limited special-forces activity reported but unconfirmed at scale.

Iranian and Proxy Responses

Iranian missile and drone strikes

Iran responded to the initial US-Israeli strikes with sustained ballistic missile and one-way attack drone barrages targeting Israel and US-allied Gulf states (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia). Launches peaked on February 28, 2026 (Day 1), with estimates of ~350-428 ballistic missiles and ~294-345 drones across targets. Numbers declined sharply due to US-Israeli strikes degrading launch capabilities. Iranian missiles have been spotted flying over the Negev desert during the missile barrages targeting Israel, as evidenced by videos shared on X.

Daily/periodic estimates (approximate, varying by source)

• February 28 (Day 1): ~350-428 ballistic missiles, ~294-345 drones.
• March 1 (Day 2): ~170-175 missiles, ~180-541 drones.
• Early March (e.g., UAE-specific): March 2: 9 missiles; March 3: 12; March 4: 3 (indicating rapid drop).
• Mid-March onward: Often ~40 or fewer missiles per day; drone volumes variable (dozens to hundreds targeted at Gulf states).
• Decline: Ballistic missile rate fell ~86-92% from Day 1 peak (e.g., from ~480 to ~40 by early March per some analyses).

Cumulative examples

• To UAE (as of 25 March 2026): 357 ballistic missiles, 1,815 drones, 15 cruise missiles (per UAE ministry).
• Overall: Iran has launched nearly 1,200 ballistic missiles and 4,000 drones at targets across the Gulf and Israel since February 28, 2026, with far more directed at Gulf states than Israel.

On April 3, 2026, Iranian air defense systems downed a US F-15E fighter jet—the first confirmed downing of a US F-15 by enemy fire in the conflict—operating near or over Iranian airspace, escalating the 6-week US-Iran air war sparked by the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Weapons Systems Officer (WSO) ejected and became the subject of an Iranian manhunt, including a bounty for capture. US forces immediately launched a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operation to recover the downed airman. Iranian forces fired upon US search and rescue helicopters during the multi-day effort. The CSAR mission successfully recovered the WSO alive from southwest Iran on the night of April 4–5, 2026 (local time), concluding a high-risk operation amid the ongoing conflict. President Donald Trump warned that the incident would negatively affect ongoing diplomatic talks aimed at de-escalation. The events highlight Iran's persistent air defense capabilities despite extensive degradation from prior US-Israeli strikes. Following the downing of US fighter jet, Islamic Republic offers reward for capture of downed US pilot in Iran (April 3, 2026) The events highlight Iran's persistent air defense capabilities despite extensive degradation from prior US-Israeli strikes. Iran downs US fighter jet, fires on SAR helicopters (April 3, 2026) Trump warns incident affects talks

Ground destructions of Iranian missile capabilities

US-Israeli air campaign targeted launchers, storage, and production: ~300 launchers destroyed by March 3; over 600 strikes on ballistic missile sites overall; significant degradation of production facilities reported. In the Institute for the Study of War's Iran Update Evening Special Report dated March 13, 2026, a senior IDF official stated that Israel destroyed 160 to 190 Iranian missile launchers and disabled another 200 as part of the US-Israeli combined force's strikes degrading Iran's offensive capabilities.^[184] Note: Exact daily figures vary across sources (defense ministries, think tanks like ISW, open-source); no single authoritative daily tally exists due to fog of war. Interception rates high (often >90% early on), limiting impacts. Israeli air defenses maintained a high interception rate against Iranian ballistic missiles, with IDF data as of March 20 showing over 90% success (out of 365 launched, ~270 intercepted) and spokesman Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani stating ~92% as of late March (over 400 total launched). Launch rates declined sharply, stabilizing at 10-15 missiles per day in mid-to-late March per Haaretz analysis, reflecting degradation from combined US-Israeli strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure. Sources: UAE Ministry reports, ISW/Critical Threats analyses, Long War Journal, etc.

Comparative Scale of Retaliatory Strikes

During the Iranian retaliation phase starting February 28, 2026, Iran launched extensive barrages of ballistic missiles and drones at Israel and across GCC states hosting U.S. military assets. Analyses from conflict monitoring projects such as the Critical Threats Project indicate that approximately 87% of missile and drone launches targeted GCC countries (including over 2,000 toward the UAE in early reports) compared with about 13% toward Israel. Thousands of projectiles struck energy infrastructure, airports, ports, and U.S. bases in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and elsewhere, producing disruptions, civilian casualties and economic effects despite high interception rates. Strikes on Israel, though significant, were smaller in volume. As of 25 March 2026 UAE defenses intercepted 357 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles and 1,815 drones. Parallel attacks hit Saudi oil-field areas, Bahraini refineries, Kuwaiti infrastructure and Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG hub. A New York Times analysis of satellite imagery, verified video and official statements (11 March 2026) identified damage to at least 17 U.S.-related sites, including approximately 11 military bases, several of them struck more than once. Affected locations comprised Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar; early-warning radar), Ali Al Salem Air Base and Camp Buehring (Kuwait; aircraft, maintenance and fuel facilities), Prince Sultan Air Base (Saudi Arabia; E-3 Sentry, KC-135 tankers and communications), U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters (Bahrain; communications) and Al Dhafra Air Base (UAE; support facilities). Iran claimed hits on the same four principal bases. The strikes damaged 11–17 U.S.-associated sites (estimated ~$800 million total, $310 million to infrastructure), killing 7 U.S. troops and wounding more than 140; some facilities were reported nearly uninhabitable in parts. Iran opened missile fire on Israel immediately after the 28 February U.S.–Israeli strikes, targeting the Sharon area among others, with at least seven waves on 9–10 March coordinated with drones.^{[185][186][187]} Hezbollah added synchronized fire from Lebanon. After Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment as Supreme Leader on 9 March, Iran maintained both proxy and direct missile campaigns.^[188][189] By late March Iran’s pre-war ballistic-missile inventory of 2,500–6,000 had launched more than 500 missiles and over 2,000 drones. U.S.–Israeli strikes destroyed hundreds of stored missiles, 70–85% of launchers (from ~400–470 to ~100–200 remaining) and production facilities, cutting launch rates by ~90% and leaving an estimated 8–10% of ballistic capacity. Drones proved more resilient. Analysts assessed remaining ballistic sustainability at 2–3 months. Early-March barrages of 20–30+ missiles plus 100-drone swarms shrank to 1–10-missile waves (7–12 per day per Alma Research Center) that frequently employed cluster warheads (50–70%). Interception rates reached 86–97% for ballistic missiles and 83–92% for drones. By mid-March the Israeli Air Force had expended more than 10,000 munitions (exceeding 15,000 by late March—more than four times the 2025 Operation Rising Lion total) against thousands of Iranian sites, including over 2,200 linked to the IRGC, Basij and internal-security forces.

Pakistani Military Deployment to Saudi Arabia

In May 2026, as Pakistan served as the main mediator in the Iran war, it deployed 8,000 troops, a squadron of approximately 16 JF-17 fighter jets (jointly produced with China), two squadrons of drones, and a Chinese HQ-9 air defense system to Saudi Arabia under a mutual defense pact signed in 2025. Saudi Arabia financed the deployment, with all equipment operated by Pakistani personnel. The forces were intended as a substantial combat-capable force (primarily advisory and training) to support Saudi Arabia's military if the kingdom came under further Iranian attack, adding to thousands of Pakistani troops already stationed there under previous agreements. The pact requires mutual defense and reportedly allows for up to 80,000 Pakistani troops. Pakistan's military and foreign office and Saudi Arabia's government media office did not respond to requests for comment.^[190]

Regional Spillover

Lebanon and Hezbollah

Hezbollah, Iran's primary proxy in Lebanon, escalated its exchanges with Israel in early March 2026, launching coordinated rocket and missile strikes on northern Israeli targets in direct support of Tehran's broader campaign against the US and Israel. These attacks, including dozens of rockets fired in operations synchronized with Iranian missile barrages, marked Hezbollah's full integration into the conflict as an extension of the 2026 Hezbollah–Israel war, which intensified amid the Iranian leadership transition and ongoing airstrikes.^{[191][192][193]} By late March Hezbollah claimed a then-record 55 attacks in a single day on Israeli positions.^[194] Israeli responses included airstrikes and ground incursions into southern Lebanon, prompting widespread evacuations and shifting Hezbollah tactics toward guerrilla warfare in anticipation of deeper invasions. This interplay, fueled by Iranian arms and directives, blurred lines between the Iran war and Hezbollah's standalone frontier clashes, amplifying cross-border fire that displaced hundreds of thousands from border areas and Beirut's southern suburbs.^[195][196] Civilian displacement surged as Israeli forces issued blanket evacuation orders from the Litani River to the border and into urban zones, forcing over 700,000 Lebanese to seek shelter in schools, stadiums, and city streets amid intensified hostilities. Hezbollah's rocket salvos and Israel's retaliatory operations exacerbated the humanitarian strain, with families fleeing southern suburbs and rural villages, highlighting the war's spillover into Lebanon's fragile infrastructure.^{[197][198][199]} On March 23, 2026, the IDF struck an IRGC Quds Force member in Beirut.^[200] On March 24, 2026, Lebanon withdrew accreditation from the Iranian ambassador, declared him persona non grata, and demanded his departure from Lebanon by March 29, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the ambassador has refused to leave the country.^[201] Lebanon's Iranian ambassador refuses to leave after expulsion This diplomatic move highlights tensions between the Lebanese government and Iran amid Hezbollah's involvement in the conflict.

Gulf States Weigh Military Options to Counter Iran’s Attacks

In retaliation, Iran attacked its Gulf neighbors, expanding the confrontation into a regional crisis. After being struck, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain reportedly joined attacks on Iran and skirmished with its Iraqi allies.^{[202][203][204][205]} Amid Iranian retaliatory strikes, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states voiced notable frustrations with US protection efforts. Complaints included lack of adequate prior warning for the retaliation's scale, perceptions that defenses favored Israel and US core assets over Gulf territories, and rapid depletion of expensive interceptors against cheaper Iranian barrages. Some described the situation as their "worst nightmare," with private anger over exposure in a conflict they sought to avoid, viewing US bases as potential liabilities. These sentiments fueled debates on alliance reliability, burden-sharing, and potential diversification of security ties, even as states continued defensive coordination and weighed greater involvement against Iran.^[206] In response to sustained Iranian missile and drone attacks on Gulf states, including the UAE, President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan declared on March 7, 2026, that the UAE was "at war" while visiting injured victims, vowing to fulfill defensive obligations and describing the nation as resilient ("thick skin and bitter flesh - no easy prey"). This reflected heightened Gulf solidarity and defensive posture without a formal offensive war declaration against Iran.^[207][208] By late March 2026, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates showed signs of shifting toward more active support for the US-Israeli campaign against Iran, prompted by repeated Iranian missile and drone attacks on their energy infrastructure, ports, and civilian sites. Saudi Arabia agreed to allow US forces to use King Fahd Air Base for operations, reversing prior positions against using its territory for strikes on Iran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is reportedly close to deciding on direct participation in attacks to restore deterrence. The UAE has cracked down on Iranian-linked assets, including closing an Iranian-owned hospital and club in Dubai, and is strongly signaling that collective military action against Iran may become inevitable if attacks on critical infrastructure continue. Reports indicate both states are providing expanded logistical support and considering offensive roles, though they have not yet launched independent strikes. This marks a departure from earlier warnings against escalation and focus on defense. Wall Street Journal Bloomberg Reuters, March 25, 2026 In May 2026, The Wall Street Journal reported that the United Arab Emirates had secretly carried out military strikes on Iran, including an early April attack on an oil refinery on Lavan Island that sparked a large fire and knocked much of the facility's capacity offline for months. The UAE did not publicly acknowledge the strikes. The United States quietly welcomed the UAE's participation. Iran described the incident as an enemy attack and responded with further missile and drone strikes on the UAE and Kuwait.^{[209][210][211][212]} On April 3, 2026, authorities in Abu Dhabi reported significant damage to the Habshan gas facilities caused by falling debris from an intercepted aerial threat, presumed to be part of Iran's retaliatory strikes, which caused fires at the site. “As part of the ongoing follow up to the previously reported incident at Habshan gas facilities, caused by falling debris following the successful interception by air defence systems, authorities confirm that two fires broke out and emergency response teams acted swiftly to bring the situation under control,” the Abu Dhabi Media Office said on Friday in a post on X. “Significant damage has occurred at the facilities and an assessment is ongoing,” it added. Source: Iran International (April 3, 2026) Kuwait also intensified its counter-terrorism efforts against Hezbollah-linked networks amid Iran's retaliatory attacks on Gulf states. On March 17, 2026, Kuwaiti authorities arrested a 16-member cell (14 Kuwaitis and 2 Lebanese nationals) linked to Hezbollah, seizing weapons, drones, explosives, and other materials intended for sabotage and hybrid operations targeting U.S. military facilities and critical infrastructure. Follow-up operations on March 18–19 resulted in the arrest of 10 Kuwaiti nationals planning attacks on vital installations. Additional arrests around March 25–26 targeted suspects involved in assassination plots against key figures, further dismantling potential Iranian proxy threats. These preemptive actions thwarted imminent dangers and illustrated the broader activation of Iran's proxy networks in the Gulf region in response to the ongoing war, complementing similar crackdowns in other Gulf states.^[213][214] Qatar, while hosting the major US Al Udeid Air Base used in regional operations, was targeted by Iranian retaliatory missile strikes starting late February/early March 2026, with damage to energy infrastructure. Qatar intercepted most attacks but condemned them. On March 24, 2026, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Majed al-Ansari stated that Iran is a permanent neighbor with ancient history in the region, total destruction is not feasible, and nations must find ways to coexist peacefully despite conflicts. This reflected Qatar's non-combatant stance, focus on self-defense, and advocacy for diplomacy over prolonged escalation, influenced by shared gas field interests with Iran. It exemplified Gulf state hedging strategies and pushes for de-escalation amid the broader regional crisis.^[215]

Iraq

Iraq became a key proxy battlefield shortly after the February 28 strikes on Iran. Iran-aligned militias within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq coalition (comprising Kata'ib Hezbollah and others), launched hundreds of drone and rocket attacks on US military bases, the US Embassy in Baghdad, facilities in Erbil (Kurdistan Region), and other targets.^[216][217] These groups claimed responsibility for over 300 attacks by mid-March, including 23 drone strikes on US assets in Erbil and assaults on Victory Base near Baghdad International Airport.^{[218][219][220][221]} US forces responded with defensive airstrikes targeting PMF headquarters and leaders in Baghdad, Anbar province, and elsewhere,^[222] killing commanders such as Kata'ib Hezbollah security chief Abu Ali al-Askari (March 14) and others in residential areas.^[223][224] Incidents included drone attacks on the US Embassy (multiple times),^[225] the Royal Tulip Al Rasheed Hotel in Baghdad's Green Zone (March 16, hosting EU/Saudi delegation),^[226] and civilian casualties from US strikes. On March 23, 2026, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite militias, including Kataib Hezbollah) released first-person-view (FPV) drone footage showing successful strikes inside the Victory Base Complex near Baghdad International Airport.^[227] The FPV drones, reportedly including fiber-optic guided variants resistant to jamming, targeted and hit a parked UH-60M/HH-60M Black Hawk helicopter (possibly a medical evacuation variant) and an AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air-defense radar (part of NASAMS systems).^[228][229] The drones loitered unopposed before impact, with no visible U.S. interception in the footage. This marked one of the first confirmed successful FPV attacks on a U.S. military aircraft.^[230] No U.S. personnel casualties were reported from this incident, though the extent of material damage to the helicopter and radar remains unconfirmed by the Pentagon. The attack underscores ongoing vulnerabilities of U.S. bases to low-cost, small FPV drones despite prior strikes degrading Iran's larger drone capabilities.^[231] By late March 2026, US airstrikes hit positions of Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Islamic Resistance groups. On March 25, a strike on the Habbaniyah base in Anbar (including its military healthcare clinic, shared with regular Iraqi forces) killed 7 Iraqi security personnel and wounded 13, according to Iraq's Ministry of Defence, which called it a heinous crime violating international laws; this followed a March 24 strike that killed 15 PMF fighters including a commander. Strikes in locations such as Habbaniyah, Anbar, Baghdad area, and Erbil killed Iraqi soldiers and PMF fighters, prompting outrage over sovereignty violations.^[232][233] The Iraqi government, under its leadership, condemned foreign strikes on its soil and militia actions dragging the country into conflict, but has limited control over powerful PMF factions. Iraqis largely oppose escalation, fearing economic and sectarian fallout. Iraq's Prime Minister summoned the US envoy, condemned the actions, and prepared UN complaints. The National Security Council authorized PMF self-defense rights against further US attacks. Militias vowed prolonged resistance in solidarity with Iran. These proxy engagements escalated tensions but stopped short of a state-level declaration of war by Iraq against the US, with Baghdad maintaining a delicate balance between its security agreements and pro-Iran factions. This front highlights Iran's horizontal escalation strategy via proxies, widening the conflict without direct invasion of Iraq. Despite the April ceasefire, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups such as the KDPI reported over 114 drone and missile attacks on their bases in the Kurdistan Region since February 28, resulting in at least 10 deaths.^[234] In May 2026, reports based on U.S. officials and other sources stated that Israel had operated a covert military outpost in Iraq's western desert (near Nukhayb, between Najaf and Anbar) as a logistical hub for Israeli Air Force operations against Iran, also housing special forces and search-and-rescue teams; the site was established shortly before the February 28 strikes with U.S. knowledge. In early March, after a local shepherd reported unusual activity including helicopter movements, Iraqi troops sent to investigate came under airstrikes that killed one soldier and wounded others, with sources attributing the strikes to Israel to prevent exposure of the site (Iraq initially attributed them to the United States and filed a UN complaint). Israel declined to comment. Iraqi officials later summoned ministers and security commanders over the reports, while some security officials denied the existence of a secret Israeli base.^{[235][236][237][238][239][240][241][242][243]}

Syria

Under the new post-Assad government, Syria has adopted a policy of strict non-involvement in the 2026 Iran war, prioritizing internal stability and reconstruction over regional entanglement.^{[244][245][246]} Despite these efforts to remain neutral, Syria experienced passive spillover effects from the conflict. Incidental debris from Iranian ballistic missiles targeting Israel caused minor injuries and property damage in Syrian territory.^[247] Specific incidents included debris fallout near Damascus on March 1, 2026,^[248] and near Qamishli on March 4, 2026.^[249] A disputed explosion in Suwayda province on February 28, 2026, was rumored to be the result of an Iranian strike but has not been confirmed as such by independent or official sources.^[250][251] In addition, the United States carried out targeted strikes on Iranian assets and proxy positions in Syria in response to attacks launched by Iranian-backed groups using Syrian territory.^[244] These events highlight Syria's unintended and passive exposure to the war, despite the government's active measures to avoid direct involvement in the conflict.

Yemen and the Houthis

Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) has expressed strong solidarity with Iran and has entered the 2026 Iran war with direct military actions by launching missile strikes on Israel starting March 28, 2026. The group's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, stated in a televised speech on March 26 that the Houthis are "not neutral" in the conflict between Iran, the US, and Israel. He warned that any developments requiring a military stance would be met with a prompt response, similar to previous rounds, and emphasized repaying loyalty to Iran for its past support during Yemen's crisis. The Houthis have prepared for potential involvement by recruiting fighters, expanding weapons production, reinforcing positions along Yemen's western Red Sea coast, and conducting civil defense drills. Senior figures have indicated readiness to target the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a critical chokepoint for global shipping, which could disrupt trade and raise oil prices further if activated, as seen during the Gaza-related disruptions in 2023–2025. On March 28, 2026, the Houthis launched their first missile attack on Israel in the context of the 2026 Iran war, followed by a second on March 29, according to multiple reports. Unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon and certain Iraqi militias, which have launched strikes in support of Iran earlier, the Houthis' direct entry came later, possibly due to strategic caution, risks of retaliation, or internal calculations amid Yemen's ongoing fronts. Analysts note this posture allows flexibility while maintaining pressure through threats and mobilization efforts, such as the "One Million Man Army" project. The situation is fluid, with potential for further escalation if the war prolongs or Iran requests additional intervention.^[252] In September 2026 Houthi forces captured the port of Mokha on 10 September, then Dhubab, Perim Island (Mayyun) in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Hanish Islands and Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline, gaining strategic control of the strait.^{[11][121][119]} The group declared a blockade targeting Saudi-linked shipping, which, together with restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, drove oil prices above $100 a barrel. Missile and drone attacks on southern Saudi cities including Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran wounded at least 73 people; the Saudi-led coalition conducted airstrikes in response.^[11][253] In early October the Presidential Leadership Council claimed recapture of Mokha, which the Houthis denied as fighting continued. Houthi ballistic-missile attacks on Saudi airports, including King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on 8 October, killed several people and damaged a Saudia aircraft.^{[254][125][255]}

Foreign support and involvement

While the primary belligerents are the United States and Israel, several other countries have provided logistical, defensive, or diplomatic support. Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait host U.S. military bases used to support operations against Iran. These nations have been drawn into the conflict through Iranian missile and drone strikes on their territories and U.S. assets, including missile attacks on bases in these countries. Initially, prior to the February 28 strikes, Gulf states (particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Oman) lobbied against escalation and preferred diplomacy. However, following Iran's missile and drone attacks starting late February 2026 on energy infrastructure, ports, airports, and civilian areas in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, positions shifted. By mid-March 2026, moderate Gulf nations—primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with alignment from Bahrain and Qatar—reportedly urged the United States to continue operations to counter Iranian threats. Reports indicate Saudi and Emirati leaders pressed President Trump in private communications to "finish the job" before any ceasefire. Saudi Arabia permitted expanded U.S. access to King Fahd Air Base, and both Saudi Arabia and UAE have considered direct military involvement if Iran targets critical power or water infrastructure. This reflects frustration with Iranian missile and drone attacks on energy infrastructure, ports, airports, and civilian areas despite Gulf neutrality in offensive operations, ending prior diplomatic progress like the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement. Oman remains an exception, consistently pushing for de-escalation and mediation. In May 2026, at a BRICS+ foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi urged member states (including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the UAE) to condemn alleged violations of international law by the United States and Israel. He accused the UAE of direct involvement in military operations against Iran. India, as BRICS chair and a party affected by Strait of Hormuz disruptions (including lost sailors), called for unimpeded maritime flows and noted concerns over unilateral sanctions inconsistent with international law.^[256]

Europe

Europe's involvement in the 2026 Iran war has been primarily diplomatic, defensive, and logistical, with no direct participation in offensive strikes against Iran. The European Union and its member states were not consulted prior to the February 28, 2026, US-Israeli strikes (Operation Epic Fury) and have largely positioned themselves on the sidelines of offensive operations while addressing spillover effects. On March 19, 2026, EU leaders convened in Brussels amid the energy crisis caused by strikes on Gulf facilities, with oil and gas prices surging and the ECB issuing inflation warnings; discussions on Ukraine aid were blocked.^[257][258] Diplomatic and Political Positions The E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom) issued a joint statement on February 28 condemning Iranian missile and drone attacks and signaling potential "proportionate defensive action" to counter missile/drone threats. Leaders emphasized de-escalation and diplomacy, with many describing the conflict as "not our war" and not a NATO operation. Divisions emerged: Spain (Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez) strongly opposed the strikes as contrary to international law. In late March 2026, Spain closed its airspace to aircraft involved in the Iran war and, according to reports, barred use of its Rota and Morón air bases for combat or refueling flights related to the conflict, forcing the U.S. to abandon plans to deploy B-52 and B-1 bombers to Morón; some sources indicate limited non-combat use of bases continued. Italy raised legal concerns; in late March 2026, Defense Minister Guido Crosetto denied U.S. permission for bombers to use Sigonella base, with requests examined on a case-by-case basis and emphasizing respect for existing agreements. Germany (Chancellor Friedrich Merz) allowed US use of Ramstein Air Base for coordination (including offensive support) but limited direct involvement. France (President Emmanuel Macron) criticized actions outside international law but permitted temporary use of its air bases by U.S. aircraft, with reports varying between allowing support for missions related to Iran strikes and restrictions to non-strike or logistical activities. President Macron rejected President Trump's call for military action to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, citing unacceptable risks and insisting it must be achieved through diplomatic coordination with Iran. Macron called for a "coalition of independence" among democratic middle powers. United Kingdom (Prime Minister Keir Starmer) initially restricted but later permitted US use of bases for "defensive" strikes on Iranian missiles threatening shipping in the Hormuz strait. European Union Commission President Ursula von der_Leyen called for a "credible transition" in Iran, tying to democratic aspirations, while the EU demanded Hormuz reopening and no strikes on energy/water infrastructure. Austria became the latest country to deny military support to the US war efforts by blocking US warplanes from using its airspace on April 2, 2026.Metro report In early April 2026, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez stated that Western powers' efforts to broker a ceasefire were akin to ‘arsonists who turn up with a bucket’ to extinguish the fire. The statement drew widespread attention and criticism regarding Spain’s continued arms exports during the war. Spain's oppositional stance toward the strikes and intervention may have enabled its vessels to navigate the Strait of Hormuz more freely despite widespread shipping disruptions. CNBC (April 8, 2026) Euronews (March 26, 2026) On April 27, 2026, Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that he had become "disillusioned" with the US-Israeli approach, as the expected quick resolution had not materialized. He said the United States lacked a convincing strategy, Iran had proven stronger than expected, and the Iranian leadership was humiliating the United States through skillful negotiations or avoidance of them, comparing the conflict to US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany maintained its offer to deploy minesweepers to the Strait of Hormuz once hostilities ended and pursued independent European diplomatic efforts while coordinating with the US.^{[259][260][261]} In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has called for the withdrawal of approximately 40,000 U.S. troops from the country in response to the 2026 Iran war. AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla stated that Germany should no longer be drawn into international conflicts through its alliance with the United States and must pursue a more independent foreign policy course to avoid entanglement in such wars. On June 23, 2026, President Donald Trump accused several European allies of failing to support the United States during the confrontation with Iran. Speaking at the White House ahead of a visit by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump stated that the US had spent vast sums helping to protect Europe but that key allies had not stood by Washington. He specifically mentioned the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, saying "We asked them to come, and they weren't there for us." Trump also questioned future US security commitments, suggesting the US could be less willing to assist allies if they were unwilling to offer support.^[262] Defensive and Logistical Contributions Several countries deployed assets defensively: France sent its aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and frigates to the region, bolstering presence after Iranian strikes on French bases (e.g., UAE). United Kingdom deployed naval/air assets to Cyprus after Iranian drone strikes on RAF Akrotiri. Greece sent frigates and F-16s to Cyprus for defense. Italy, Netherlands, Spain pledged warships/air defense to Cyprus. Expanded EU Operation Aspides for maritime security in Red Sea/Mediterranean. Quiet logistical support included US use of bases/airspace in UK, Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal for refueling/transit/coordination, often framed as defensive or pre-existing. In August 2026, Iranian forces assessed possible strikes against U.S. military assets in southeastern Europe, including bases in Bulgaria (such as Bezmer Air Base, which had recently hosted U.S. refueling aircraft) and Cyprus, should the United States escalate the conflict. Iran also examined attacks on subsea fiber-optic cables in the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. European Command stated it was aware of the reporting and would take appropriate actions. Analysts described the potential threat to Europe as real but limited to southern and southeastern areas, with questions raised about missile accuracy at that range.^[263][264]

Impacts and Concerns

The war caused energy crisis risks for Europe: Iranian Hormuz actions and Gulf disruptions drove oil to over $100/barrel (Brent) and European gas spot prices doubling from under €30/MWh to over €60/MWh by early March. This threatened post-Russia diversification, with higher LNG needs (US/Qatar) and potential shortages. Additional concerns included terrorism risks from Iranian proxies targeting Jewish/Israeli sites in Europe, refugee flows, and industrial slowdowns (e.g., Germany). In March 2026 a series of attacks struck Jewish sites in Europe, including a 9 March explosion that damaged a synagogue in Liège, an arson-explosion outside a Rotterdam synagogue on 13 March and a 14 March explosion at a Jewish school in Amsterdam;^{[265][266][267]} Israel's Diaspora Affairs Ministry attributed them to Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia, which it described as a new Iran-linked group.^[268] Europe's response highlights divisions on intervention, strategic autonomy vs. US alignment, and preference for diplomacy amid economic/security fallout.

China and Russia

Russia has provided Iran with real-time intelligence on U.S. military positions, including satellite imagery of warships and aircraft, aiding Iranian targeting efforts, according to U.S. intelligence reports. Reports indicate Russia is supplying or upgrading drones (including Shahed variants) for use against U.S. and Israeli forces, with phased shipments ongoing in March 2026. Moscow has aided upgrades to Iranian Shahed drones and provided related technical support. Russia has confirmed ongoing military-technical cooperation and supplies of certain military products, though denying direct intelligence on U.S. positions in some statements. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in March 2026 that military cooperation with Russia continues and is not secret. In late April 2026, U.S. officials including General Dan Caine confirmed ongoing Russian support for Iran's war effort (including intelligence sharing), contradicting prior Kremlin denials; Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated Russia transferred drones to Iran for strikes on U.S. bases.^[269] A September 2026 CNN investigation using orbital tracking found that 14 Russian reconnaissance satellites overflew Prince Sultan Air Base two days before a 27 March Iranian strike that wounded 12 U.S. personnel; U.S. officials said the data aided precision targeting.^[270] Western officials told Bloomberg in June and October 2026 that Russia supplied missiles, helping Iran replenish stocks to roughly three-quarters of pre-war levels during a ceasefire while underground manufacturing survived strikes.^[271] Russia sent no combat troops, its role constrained by the war in Ukraine, and abstained (with China) from UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf states. On 8–9 October 2026 President Vladimir Putin met President Masoud Pezeshkian in Turkmenistan and offered to do everything in Russia's power to help settle the conflict diplomatically.^[272] China has not committed combat forces. Beijing condemned the initial U.S. and Israeli strikes, called for a ceasefire, jointly issued a five-point peace proposal with Pakistan, and was reported to have encouraged Iran to accept the April 2026 humanitarian ceasefire.^[273] It remains Iran’s largest oil customer. Reports of material support have focused on dual-use goods. Iranian customs records analyzed by The Wall Street Journal showed approximately 1,300 shipments of dual-use components, including GPS devices, electric motors and aircraft-engine parts, from Chinese entities to Iran’s Defense Ministry in the first half of 2026, some arriving around the June memorandum.^[274] Sodium perchlorate, a missile-propellant precursor, continued to be shipped from Chinese ports. The Financial Times reported that the IRGC Aerospace Force acquired operational control of a Chinese-built reconnaissance satellite (TEE-01B) in late 2024; U.S. officials later linked Chinese commercial satellite imagery to Iranian targeting of U.S. facilities, including a July 2026 missile strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan that killed three American service members. The United States sanctioned several Chinese imagery companies in May 2026.^[275][276] Reuters reported in July 2026 that Iran had signed a contract, via a Hong Kong intermediary, for 300–400 Chinese QW-12 and FN-16 man-portable air-defense systems.^[277] China has denied supplying weapons or intelligence and has instructed companies to disregard certain U.S. secondary sanctions. Access to the BeiDou navigation system has also been cited as improving Iranian missile and drone accuracy.

Economic and Strategic Impacts

The Strait of Hormuz, the transit route for about 20% of global seaborne oil and a large share of liquefied natural gas (LNG), became the war’s principal economic chokepoint. The International Energy Agency described the resulting oil-supply disruption as the largest in history.^[278][279]

Strait of Hormuz blockade

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps began restricting the strait on 4 March 2026. Transits fell from a pre-war average of about 100–138 vessels per day to a handful; the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre recorded no more than five ships per day in early March, and four cargo vessels transited on 17 March. More than 90 tankers and about 20,000 seafarers were reported stranded.^[280][281] Iran applied a selective passage regime, including a reported $1 per barrel toll payable in Chinese yuan or stablecoins. Malaysian tankers were among those granted exemptions; the French-owned CMA CGM Kribi transited in early April. U.S.- and Israeli-linked or noncompliant vessels were blocked or struck, including the Thai cargo ship Mayuree Naree.^[282] On 26 March the Israel Defense Forces killed IRGC Navy commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, whom Israel identified as directing the blockade. After a ceasefire on 7–8 April, Iran announced a partial reopening on 16–17 April; ship-tracking data showed about 11–20 vessels per day amid remaining mines, insurance constraints and a U.S. naval blockade of some Iran-linked traffic. WTI fell to around $83.85 per barrel on the news.^[283] U.S. forces boarded Iran-linked oil tankers, including the Tifani and Majestic X in April, and moved to seize their cargoes.^[284]

Energy

April Israeli strikes were reported to have disabled about 85% of Iranian petrochemical capacity. Iranian missile strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City on 18–19 March damaged two of 14 LNG trains, about 17% of QatarEnergy’s export capacity; QatarEnergy said repairs would take three to five years and that it would declare force majeure on some long-term contracts. Helium recovered as a by-product of Qatari LNG processing left on the order of a tenth of global supply at risk while Ras Laffan remained offline.^[285][286] Brent crude rose from the mid-$60s–$70s before the war to above $100 on 12 March and later peaked near $118–$120; it later fell to $71.57 on 1 July before returning toward $96–$100 as tensions rose again. Coordinated Strategic Petroleum Reserve and IEA releases (United States: 172 million barrels) were used to cushion the shock. On 20 March the U.S. Treasury issued a short-term waiver for about 140 million barrels of Iranian crude already in transit. Other measures included Jones Act waivers and eased restrictions on some Venezuelan and Russian oil.^[287][288] By early October 2026, Gulf oil flows excluding Iran had recovered to over 81% of pre-war levels in September (Vortexa data put combined crude, condensate and refined-fuel shipments at an average 19.2 million barrels per day, versus about 23.6 million before the war), led by a rebound in Saudi exports, while Iranian exports fell to zero under the U.S. blockade. Crude and condensate recovered more than refined products. LNG transits through the Strait of Hormuz remained more than 75% below pre-war volumes despite a September pickup. Brent crude traded around $100 a barrel, with prices sensitive to further Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure. On 2 October the G7 announced a coordinated release of 100 million barrels of oil and diesel stocks through the International Energy Agency over four months, including a front-loaded diesel component. Iraq devalued the dinar by about 14.5% on 7 October in response to disrupted oil revenue. The World Bank warned that several Asian governments were exhausting fiscal and reserve buffers used to cushion the energy shock. The European Union moved toward a one-year delay of methane-emissions rules for fossil-fuel imports, while South Korea unveiled a 1,000 trillion won (about $747 billion) energy-transition and industrial-decarbonisation plan through 2035.^{[289][290][291][292][293][294]} In late April 2026, TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné warned that a further two or three months of Hormuz blockade could produce energy shortages, including in France; he said the company had lost 15% of its Middle East production. French President Emmanuel Macron restated efforts to reopen the strait without tolls.^[295][296] On 23 March, roughly 6,200 Brent and WTI futures contracts with a notional value of about $580 million changed hands in a one-minute window about 15 minutes before President Trump posted that talks with Iran had been “productive,” after which crude sold off sharply. The trades drew public scrutiny; it was not established who placed them or that they constituted unlawful insider dealing.^[297]

Commodities, humanitarian and consumer effects

The blockade disrupted Gulf fertilizer shipments, contributing to higher prices for agricultural inputs.^[298] Gulf Cooperation Council states, which rely on the strait for most food imports, faced a mid-March grocery emergency, with reports of about 70% of regional food imports disrupted and consumer-price spikes of 40–120%.^[299] Strikes on desalination plants threatened municipal water supplies that provide most drinking water in Kuwait and Qatar.^[300] A United Nations Development Programme estimate published on 31 March put potential GDP losses in Arab economies at $120–194 billion.^[301] U.S. regular gasoline averaged about $3.98–$4.10 per gallon by late March (California $5.40–$5.70 in some markets), with diesel about $5.00–$5.40.^[302] Canadian retail gasoline rose by about 35–45 cents per litre to around 170–174 cents.^[303] Australia, which imports most refined fuels, saw more than 200 dry stations in New South Wales and diesel shortages that stranded outback transport.^[304] Panic buying and rationing were reported in several Asian and African importers.^[305] EV-related inquiries rose about 20% in the United States in the first week of fighting.^[306]

Aviation and shipping

Closed or restricted airspace over Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE, together with a doubling of jet-fuel prices (to about $4.32 per gallon in some markets), produced widespread cancellations, longer Europe–Asia routings and fare increases of 15–124% on some U.S. bookings. Air Canada cut low-margin routes; Spirit Airlines ceased operations on 2 May 2026 after jet fuel rose well above the price assumed in its restructuring plan.^[307][308] Houthi entry into the war on 28 March pushed more Suez and Bab el-Mandeb traffic onto the Cape of Good Hope route. The U.S. Department of State issued Level 3 (Reconsider Travel) advisories for Oman, Qatar and the UAE; Australia advised “Do Not Travel” to the UAE.^[309][310] On 18 October 2026, the U.S. Mission to the United Arab Emirates and the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait each issued Security Alerts stating that Americans currently in the Middle East should exercise heightened vigilance due to the complex security environment and be aware of potential flight cancellations, airspace closures, and travel disruptions. Both alerts said Iranian-supported Houthis had engaged in hostilities against Saudi Arabia, including attacks on civilian airports and other critical infrastructure resulting in civilian casualties and severe travel disruptions, and that the hostilities had the potential to escalate rapidly beyond that immediate area.^[311][312]

Operation Economic Outcast

On 19 August 2026 President Donald Trump described an impending campaign of economic isolation against Iran as an “economic D-Day,” warning that countries whose financial institutions, businesses or government entities provided Iran a “lifeline” would face severe consequences.^[313][314] On 24 August Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced Operation Economic Outcast, which the Treasury Department called a whole-of-government secondary-sanctions campaign to cut remaining Iranian oil revenue, banking access and military procurement.^[9] The Office of Foreign Assets Control issued determinations under Executive Order 13902 covering digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping; designated nearly 60 entities, individuals and vessels; suspended general licenses that had allowed certain remittances and some Iranian access to U.S. academic systems; and issued guidance on sanctions risks tied to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.^[9] Bessent said the objective was to “sever every economic lifeline that sustains this tyrannical regime until Tehran stands alone.”^[315] Days earlier the United Arab Emirates had suspended all trade and financial transactions with Iran after accusing Tehran of firing ballistic missiles toward its territory; Iran denied the allegation.^[316] Later actions under the operation included 8 September designations against remaining Iranian airlines and aviation intermediaries,^[317] expansion into military-procurement networks,^[318] and an 8 October designation of 17 shadow-fleet vessels that Treasury said “effectively neutralize[d] the vast majority of Iran’s remaining shadow fleet network”; analysts noted that Iran had already delivered most oil then at sea and that remaining seaborne volumes were limited.^[122][319] Bessent called for branches of state-owned Bank Melli to be closed abroad and said any entity facilitating money laundering for Iran risked exclusion from the U.S. dollar system.^[320] Iranian officials rejected the campaign as economic coercion; Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described secondary sanctions as an attempt to compel other states to join an economic siege.^[321] China remained the principal remaining buyer of Iranian oil, largely through independent refiners; U.S. officials threatened but did not impose sanctions on major Chinese financial institutions, citing risks of further oil-market disruption.^[322] Independent reporting in October found that some administration projections of a rapid worldwide grounding of Iranian airlines and an imminent end to oil sales had not fully materialized, while land-route exports continued and the rial traded at record lows.^[320] Designations and sectoral expansions are a matter of public record; claims that Iranian networks have been neutralized or that the campaign will produce regime collapse remain official assessments rather than independently verified outcomes.

Macroeconomy and financial markets

Estimates of damage inside Iran ranged from $300 billion to $1 trillion; the rial fell to historic lows of about 2.5–2.7 million per U.S. dollar.^[323] The IMF cut its 2026 world growth forecast to 3.0%; a July survey of economists put U.S. recession odds at 25%.^[324] Dutch TTF gas nearly doubled to over €60/MWh; the ECB postponed planned rate cuts. On 25 March ECB President Christine Lagarde said the bank could raise euro-area rates if the war kept inflation above target for a prolonged period.^[325] The U.S. 10-year yield rose from about 3.93% to as high as 4.46% in late March, and 30-year mortgage rates reached 6.38%. Equities sold off on the opening shock and again in late March: the S&P 500 closed at 6,878.88 on 27 February, the last session before the strikes,^[326] fell about 5–7% from its January peak, then recovered strongly into July, climbing above 7,000 after Iran announced a partial Hormuz reopening on 16–17 April.^[327][328] On 26 March the S&P 500 fell 1.7% to 6,477.16, the Nasdaq Composite about 2.4% and the Dow Jones Industrial Average about 1.0%.^[329] India’s Sensex and Nifty lost about 9% from late February through late March; on 27 March the Sensex fell 2.25% to 73,583.22 and the Nifty 2.09% to 22,819.60, while the rupee closed at a record low.^[330] Bitcoin traded as low as about $63,000 at the outbreak, with later liquidations of more than $400 million in leveraged longs as it traded around $68,200; Iranian platforms such as Nobitex saw capital-flight outflows.

Military costs and funding

U.S. operating costs were reported at $11.3 billion in the first six days and about $25 billion by the end of April. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate on 22 July that the war had cost an estimated $37.5 billion and pressed for a $67 billion supplemental. A Pentagon inspector-general report covering April–June put the mission at $33.4 billion through June (munitions more than $22 billion). U.S. military costs reached $43.6 billion through 3 September, of which munitions accounted for more than 60 percent. The U.S. military reported 18 service members killed.^{[331][332][333]} An American Enterprise Institute assessment put repair costs for damage at U.S. installations at more than $5 billion, with reporting that Iran hit more than 100 targets at 11 bases in seven Gulf countries, including Camp Buehring in Kuwait.^[334] Senator Mark Kelly said stocks of Tomahawk, Patriot, SM-3 and ATACMS munitions had been drawn down to a degree that would take years to rebuild.^[335] In a September 2026 analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the conflict had cost the Department of Defense approximately $38 billion as of 1 August 2026, counting only costs not already accounted for in the federal budget.^[336] It put the cost of replacing munitions expended through 1 August at $21.7 billion ($13.1 billion for missile defense interceptors, $7.3 billion for land-attack cruise missiles and $1.2 billion for other munitions), estimated that the United States had probably used between one-half and two-thirds of its inventory of certain missile interceptors, and said replacing those interceptors would probably take at least five years even at an increased rate of production.^[337][338] After a 1 October disarmament ultimatum lapsed, the United States reinforced the theater with about 9,000 additional personnel, the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, the USS Makin Island amphibious ready group, and further Patriot batteries.^[96]

United States homeland security and terrorism threat implications

No new public National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin was issued in the early phase of the war; NTAS updates had lapsed with a federal funding gap. A 22 June 2025 NTAS bulletin, issued during earlier Iran–Israel fighting, had described a heightened U.S. threat environment, including low-level cyber activity by pro-Iranian actors and the risk that violent extremists could mobilize independently if Iranian leadership called for retaliatory violence.^[339] Federal agencies, including the FBI and DHS, placed counterterrorism resources on high alert after the 28 February strikes. Intelligence assessments warned that Iran and its proxies probably posed a persistent threat of targeted attacks in the United States, with large-scale physical attacks judged unlikely and low-level cyber operations and lone-actor violence the primary concerns. On 27 March the Iran-linked Handala Hack Team breached FBI Director Kash Patel’s personal email account and published personal photographs and documents; the FBI said the published material was historical and contained no government information, and offered a $10 million reward for information identifying the group.^[340][341] On 23 March four ambulances belonging to a Jewish volunteer emergency service in London were set on fire in an arson attack claimed by an Iran-aligned militant group; British authorities treated the incident as an antisemitic hate crime.^[342][343] The U.S. Department of State issued a Worldwide Caution on 22 March advising Americans, especially in the Middle East, to exercise increased caution because of possible retaliation against U.S. interests, airspace closures, and targeting of diplomatic facilities.^[344] On 25 March TSA officials warned of possible airport disruptions after a funding lapse, with ICE agents deployed to assist at some airports.^{[345][346][347]}

Broader geopolitical effects

The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader was denounced by the United States. President Trump called it “unacceptable” and treated it as continuity of IRGC-aligned theocratic rule and proxy alliances. Israel’s defense minister labeled him an “unequivocal target for elimination.”^[348][349] The succession took place amid ongoing Iranian strikes on Israel and Gulf states. Khamenei's killing produced a leadership transition rather than immediate regime collapse or the mass uprising some officials and opposition figures had anticipated; research on subsequent protest activity inside Iran found mobilisation shifting toward pro-government rallies against the strikes rather than anti-government revolt.^[350] Analysts described the war as lacking a clear U.S. exit strategy and limited diplomatic off-ramps given demands for Iranian nuclear and proxy concessions. They warned that a premature withdrawal could create a regional vacuum for China, Russia, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, while a prolonged deployment would divert U.S. resources and risk empowering asymmetric threats. Reporting also credited sustained U.S. operations with degrading proxies such as Hezbollah and shifting regional power toward Israel and its allies.^{[351][352][353]} President Trump’s approval rating fell to a career-low 32 percent.^[354] Public opinion in the United States and elsewhere opposed the war, with roughly 7 in 10 Americans saying it was not worth fighting.^[355][356] ACLED recorded more than 990 demonstrations worldwide between 28 February and 6 March 2026, both for and against Iran's government and both for and against the U.S.–Israeli campaign; of 145 events recorded in the United States, most opposed the campaign, while in European cities with large Iranian exile communities many gatherings celebrated Khamenei's death.^[357] The deadliest clashes were in Pakistan, where at least 26 people were killed on 1 March, including during an attempt to storm the U.S. consulate in Karachi and unrest in Skardu and Islamabad.^[358][359] As of March 27, 2026, amid continued disruptions, President Trump extended the ultimatum deadline again, noting productive talks and Iran's allowance of some oil tankers through the strait as a goodwill gesture. However, challenges persist: a Thai cargo ship, Mayuree Naree, was attacked by projectiles off Qeshm Island, running aground with an ensuing explosion and fire; three crew members are missing.^[360] The blockade has left around 20,000 seafarers stranded in the Strait of Hormuz, with many crews facing shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies as shipping remains severely disrupted. A Canadian YouTuber, as reported by Mario Nawfal on X, counted at least 90 tankers stuck and unable to transit the Strait of Hormuz—those visible only from his position Mario Nawfal's report on X. The UAE has expressed willingness to deploy naval forces as part of a multinational effort to reopen the strait. These developments coincide with rebounding oil prices around $96–97 per barrel, reflecting ongoing market sensitivity to Hormuz risks. US-Iran tensions at the Hormuz Strait threaten immediate price shocks and sustained volatility in global oil markets, a vulnerability dramatically underscored by incidents such as the attack leading to a burning vessel in the strait. ^[361] For broader context, see the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis. In late March 2026, Iran exempted seven Malaysian tankers from transit tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the selective application of the toll regime and countering assertions of a universal fee structure. However, the ongoing disruptions and blockade effects increased Malaysia's oil import costs by approximately 40%. To mitigate the impact, the Malaysian government secured additional fuel reserves through May, introduced fuel quotas, enforced remote-work policies in certain sectors, and adjusted subsidy allocations. On April 3, 2026, a container ship signaling French ownership exited the Strait of Hormuz, marking the first known transit by a vessel linked to Western Europe since the waterway was largely shut by the conflict, Bloomberg reported, citing ship-tracking data and people familiar with the matter Bloomberg via Iran International. The CMA CGM Kribi sailed from waters off Dubai toward Iran on Thursday afternoon local time, signaling its French ownership, the report said. The vessel stayed close to the Iranian coast, moving through a channel between Qeshm and Larak islands while broadcasting its journey, according to the report. By Friday morning, it signaled it was off Muscat, the report said, citing two people familiar with the situation who confirmed the crossing. This passage, amid Iran's selective enforcement of the blockade, underscores approved exemptions for certain non-US and non-Israeli affiliated shipping while prohibitions remain firmly in place against vessels linked to the belligerents. The conflict triggered significant volatility in global energy markets and financial systems. Iran's threats to close or restrict the Strait of Hormuz—a chokepoint for approximately 20% of the world's oil supply—led to a sharp surge in crude oil prices. Brent crude rose well above $100 per barrel, briefly approaching $119, before partial retracements amid evolving headlines on shipping access and potential reserve releases. Prices remained volatile, rebounding as the conflict persisted without clear resolution. The conflict has triggered a severe global energy crisis—the largest supply disruption since the 1970s—compounded by deadlocked diplomatic efforts, including Russia, China, and France blocking a UN resolution to secure Hormuz Strait shipping from Iranian retaliatory disruptions following US-Israeli airstrikes. The resulting restrictions have reduced tanker traffic, pushed Brent crude to $109/bbl, and doubled European gas prices. The blockade has also halted shipments of fertilizer through the Strait of Hormuz, where a significant share of global fertilizer trade transits, leading to widespread shortages, surging prices for agricultural inputs, and heightened risks to global food security.^[279] In response to the Hormuz Strait disruptions driving European natural gas prices up by approximately 70%, five EU ministers proposed reinstating a 2022-style windfall tax on energy companies to fund relief efforts for households and businesses affected by the energy crisis. The proposal drew warnings that such a tax could stifle investment in the sector and hinder long-term energy security. This energy shock contributed to heightened inflation expectations, pushing US Treasury yields higher. The 10-year Treasury yield spiked notably, reaching 4.39% on March 20, 2026—the highest since July 2025—up from lows around 3.93% in early March following initial haven flows that reversed into inflation trades. Bond market concerns over persistent inflation, leveraged position unwinds, and increased debt supply aggravated the sell-off. Consequently, US 30-year fixed mortgage rates climbed to 6.38% as of March 26, 2026 (per Freddie Mac data), marking a four-week rise to the highest level since September 2025. These developments exacerbated affordability challenges in housing markets already strained by prior low-rate lock-in effects. ''See main article: Economic Impact of the 2026 Iran war'' The conflict triggered notable volatility in global financial markets, particularly in the United States. The S&P 500 closed at 6,878.88 on February 27, 2026, the last trading day before the initial strikes. By March 20, 2026, it had declined approximately 5.4% since the war began, closing at 6,506.48 amid concerns over prolonged conflict, rising oil prices, and inflation risks. The index hit 2026 lows in mid-to-late March, with some sessions showing single-day drops of 1-1.5% and occasional gap-down opens due to overnight developments. Overall, the S&P 500 fell roughly 5-7% in the first four weeks, erasing several trillion in broader market capitalization, though markets remained resilient relative to the geopolitical shock, with partial recoveries on de-escalation hopes or easing oil prices. Energy sectors outperformed while broader indices faced pressure from risk aversion. The partial resumption eased immediate supply disruption fears, triggering a sharp correction in oil prices: WTI crude plunged 9-12% to around $83.85 per barrel, while Brent saw similar declines. Equity markets rallied strongly on the news, with the S&P 500 climbing above 7,000 and extending gains in a tech-led recovery. CNBC (April 17, 2026) Fox Business 247 Wall St. Anadolu Agency Prediction markets reflected optimism for further normalization, with Polymarket assigning an 87% probability to Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by the end of June 2026. Key catalysts included the April ceasefire and observed reopenings, though analysts continued monitoring inventory buildups, rerouting economics, and real-time data from tracking services. Polymarket S&P Global In the Middle East, vehicle sales stalled amid instability, with forecasts for 2026 light vehicle sales revised downward by approximately 12.5% to 2.7 million units (from 3.1 million), half of the adjustment due to a 20% cut in Iran's forecast from 950,000 to 760,000 units. Production in Iran halted, with about 83% of the country's 1.1 million vehicles produced in 2025 sold domestically now offline. Automakers with strong regional presence, such as Toyota (17% market share), Hyundai (10%), and Chinese brands like Chery (5%), faced disrupted shipments and sales risks in neighboring markets like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait. Premium segments, including Porsche and Audi, saw weakened demand due to potential wealth effects from energy shocks. Globally, higher fuel costs raised concerns of reduced auto sales, drawing parallels to historical oil crises where U.S. sales dropped over 10% (sometimes 40% or more). As of mid-March 2026, U.S. gasoline prices rose significantly (e.g., 27% since late February to around $3.60/gallon), but major automakers like General Motors reported no material sales impact yet, noting it may take 4-6 months of sustained high prices for consumer behavior to shift noticeably toward more efficient vehicles or delayed purchases. Detroit automakers, reliant on trucks and SUVs, were seen as particularly vulnerable. Supply chain pressures included higher costs for aluminum, plastics, and logistics, prompting production cuts by some manufacturers (e.g., Toyota reducing Middle East-bound output). Conversely, elevated fuel prices boosted interest in electric vehicles (EVs) and hybrids, with increased search traffic, used EV sales in Europe, and potential long-term acceleration of the energy transition, especially in Asia and the U.S. where EV inquiries rose amid fears of shortages. The conflict has caused significant disruptions to global oil supplies, primarily through threats to the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on energy infrastructure, leading to oil prices surging past $100 per barrel. Discussions of potential U.S. ground troop deployments inside Iran have added to market uncertainty, as analysts warn that such actions could signal a prolonged engagement, deterring tanker traffic further, increasing insurance premiums, and sustaining or exacerbating the war premium in oil pricing. This risk of escalation has kept prices volatile, with some projections suggesting even higher levels if ground operations materialize and lead to wider regional involvement. US domestic crude production remained stable with no immediate increase, holding near 13.6 million b/d. The EIA's March 2026 outlook revised 2027 production upward to 13.8 million b/d (from a prior lower forecast) due to price incentives, though 2026 averages remained flat at 13.6 million b/d, highlighting time lags in the shale response. On March 20, 2026, the United States Treasury Department issued a short-term waiver permitting the sale of Iranian oil already in transit, without allowing new purchases. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated this would inject around 140 million barrels into the global market to ease energy-crisis pressures, while emphasizing continued maximum pressure on Iran's access to the international financial system and revenue from oil sales. This occurred amid a sharp decline in Middle East daily oil exports of at least 60 percent since the war began. On March 24, 2026, Brent crude oil prices dropped nearly 6 percent following reports that U.S. President Donald Trump had sent a peace plan to Iran and claims of productive talks, temporarily easing market fears despite persistent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf energy supplies. On March 26, 2026, renewed uncertainty over diplomacy—specifically Iran's denial of direct U.S. talks—drove a sharp intraday rise, with Brent exceeding $104 per barrel amid fears of extended Strait disruptions. This exemplified ongoing market sensitivity to any signals of prolonged conflict. The sharp rise in crude oil prices directly affected jet fuel costs, which nearly doubled in some regions since the conflict began on February 28, 2026. This produced significant hikes in airline ticket prices, particularly for U.S. domestic and international flights. According to Deutsche Bank analysis, average domestic airfares for later-March bookings rose between 15 percent and 124 percent compared with prior weeks, with transcontinental flights jumping from approximately $167 to $414. Carriers such as Spirit Airlines saw some of the steepest increases, while executives from major airlines such as United Airlines warned of impending fare hikes to offset added fuel expenses estimated to add billions in industry-wide costs. Unlike some international carriers, major U.S. airlines do not hedge jet fuel financially and instead pass costs to consumers through higher fares and capacity adjustments. Travelers were advised to book summer 2026 flights promptly to lock in rates amid ongoing volatility. International carriers faced similar pressures. Air Canada suspended six low-margin routes from June to October 2026, including Toronto (YYZ) and Montreal (YUL) to New York (JFK), citing doubled jet-fuel prices of approximately $4.32 per gallon. The move reflected a pivot from the airline's record 2025 financial performance toward balance-sheet defense and cost management.^{[308][362][363]} Air Canada also faced intensified labor and operational headwinds in 2026, including wage arbitration for flight attendants, the expiration of contracts covering roughly 5,800 customer-service agents on February 28, 2026 (the day the conflict began), and external labor disruptions at Frankfurt Airport on April 18.^[364][365]

• Lag in retail pricing: Retail prices reflect replacement costs with a delay of days to weeks as refineries process higher-cost crude, wholesale markets adjust, and stations pass on increases.
• Seasonal demand and supply factors: Spring brought warmer weather and increased driving (spring break travel), boosting gasoline demand. Refineries conducted maintenance and transitioned to costlier summer-blend gasoline (with additives to reduce evaporation), temporarily tightening supply.
• Diesel specifics: Diesel rose faster than gasoline due to pre-existing tight inventories from cold winter heating oil demand (similar composition), global supply strains from Middle East disruptions, and strong freight/shipping needs. Diesel cracks widened significantly.

As of March 25, 2026, the US national average for regular gasoline reached approximately $3.98–$4.10 per gallon (up from pre-conflict levels near $3), with diesel at roughly $5.00–$5.40 per gallon nationally (exceeding $6–$7 in states like California and Washington). These increases amplified transportation costs, contributing to broader inflationary pressures on goods and services. This retail surge persisted despite some crude price easing, illustrating how geopolitical shocks, combined with seasonal dynamics and refining logistics, can sustain elevated pump prices. To address the surge in domestic gas prices resulting from the Strait of Hormuz disruption, the Trump administration implemented several measures:

• Released oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), including coordinated international actions and direct lending to oil companies (e.g., initial batches under plans for up to 172 million barrels).
• Issued a temporary waiver of the Jones Act to allow greater flexibility in domestic oil shipping between US ports.
• Lifted or eased sanctions on Russian and Venezuelan oil imports to boost global supply.
• Authorized increased domestic production, such as restarting offshore drilling off California's coast.
• Considered or discussed a federal gasoline tax holiday and regulatory changes to permit higher ethanol blends in summer gasoline.
• Provided US-backed risk insurance and naval escorts for tankers attempting to navigate the Strait of Hormuz.

President Trump repeatedly stated that gas prices would "drop very, very rapidly" or return to lower levels "when this is over," describing the spike as temporary and a "small price" for achieving strategic objectives against Iran's nuclear and regional threats. The Trump administration regarded oil prices exceeding $100 per barrel as a temporary spike caused by disruptions such as the Strait of Hormuz closure and strikes on Iran's Kharg Island oil hub. Officials, including Trump, predicted a swift end to the conflict and subsequent price decline, while urging allies to join a coalition to secure the strait and reassure markets. Administration officials projected relief within weeks of de-escalation, though analysts noted potential lags of weeks to months due to market dynamics.^[366][367] These steps aimed to stabilize prices amid ongoing negotiations, including the US 15-point plan demanding reopening of the Strait. The war-induced oil price surges have also spurred renewed interest in alternative transportation, particularly electric vehicles in the United States. Reports indicate a 20% jump in EV-related online searches in the initial week of hostilities, alongside increased consumer research into electrified options as gasoline prices rose sharply, potentially accelerating adoption amid heightened awareness of oil supply risks. As of mid-March 2026, amid the ongoing conflict, the United States Department of Defense (Pentagon) sought White House approval to request over $200 billion in supplemental funding from Congress for activities related to the war. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the forthcoming request during a press conference, stating that the funds were needed "for what’s been done, for what we may have to do in the future," to ensure ammunition stockpiles are "not just refilled, but above and beyond." He remarked, "It takes money to kill bad guys," and noted that the $200 billion figure "could move." President Donald Trump described the request as "a small price to pay" to maintain U.S. military readiness in a "very volatile world," attributing stockpile depletions in part to prior aid shipments to Ukraine. Direct costs of the conflict to date have been estimated at $10–25 billion, with daily expenditures around $0.5–1 billion, according to various analyses. The majority of the proposed $200 billion is intended for replenishing munitions expended in the Iran operations and building larger inventories for potential future requirements, rather than immediate combat expenses. Experts note that fulfilling such contracts would take years. As of late March 2026, the war's costs included significant US military expenditures, with the Pentagon reporting over $11.3 billion in the first six days alone (excluding buildup costs). Global oil markets saw Brent crude surpass $90-92 per barrel amid disruptions to ~20 million barrels/day through the Strait of Hormuz, driving up gas and heating prices worldwide. US service member deaths remained in the low double digits, while Iranian casualties (military and civilian) reached thousands. Environmental consequences included oil facility strikes causing black rain and pollution in Tehran. The request, in addition to the regular defense budget, has sparked debate in Congress, with bipartisan concerns over the amount, war objectives, and competing domestic priorities. Some lawmakers support it for national security, while others oppose or seek reductions. FY2027 Budget Trade-off: A historic $1.5T defense surge to 5% GDP (targeting China/Iran), funded by 10% cuts ($73B) to non-defense discretionary programs. In May 2026, Senator Mark Kelly, a member of the Armed Services Committee, warned that US stocks of ammunition and missiles were severely depleted, stating it was shocking how deep into the magazines they had gone and that it would take years to rebuild stockpiles of Tomahawks, ATACMS, SM-3s and Patriot munitions. He said the United States had been drawn into a war with Iran without a strategic goal, plan or timeline. According to the Pentagon, the war had cost approximately $25 billion as of the end of April 2026, with the largest share spent on munitions.^[335] On July 22, 2026, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told a US Senate hearing that the war had cost an estimated $37.5 billion, up from a previous $29 billion estimate; the figure included incurred costs and projected spending through September 30, covering military pay as well as operating and maintenance costs. Hegseth used the hearing to press for a $67 billion supplemental defence funding request to maintain military readiness, replace equipment used in the conflict and accelerate investment in munitions. The US military reported 18 service members killed.^[331] A September 2026 report by the Pentagon's inspector general acknowledged ammunition shortages resulting from the conflict. The report, covering April to June 2026, stated that ammunition consumption during Operation Epic Fury caused "strategic inventory shortfalls" and revealed industrial base bottlenecks for munitions resupply. The Department of Defense estimated the cost of the mission up to the end of June at $33.4 billion, with expended munitions accounting for over $22 billion. Efforts were underway to streamline procurement processes and production lead times and to stockpile critical materials, components and selected munitions. The report focused primarily on long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot interceptor missiles.^[368] U.S. military costs reached $43.6 billion through 3 September 2026, of which munitions accounted for more than 60 percent.^[332][333] After a 1 October disarmament ultimatum lapsed, the United States reinforced the theater with about 9,000 additional personnel, the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, the USS Makin Island amphibious ready group, and further Patriot batteries.^[96]

Casualties and Humanitarian Crisis

Casualties

Casualty figures for the 2026 Iran war remain highly disputed as of late March 2026 due to the fog of war, restricted access in Iran, and differing methodologies. Iranian Health Ministry figures state at least 1,937 people killed and 24,800 injured since February 28, 2026. US and Israeli sources state over 6,000 Iranian military personnel killed, with approximately 15,000 wounded. HRANA (US-based human rights group) figures state approximately 3,329 killed (1,167 military personnel, 1,492 civilians, 670 unclassified), including at least 217 children among civilians. Hengaw figures state around 6,530 killed, including at least 5,890 military personnel and 640 civilians. These estimates vary significantly, with Iranian officials often citing lower totals focused on overall deaths, while US/Israeli claims prioritize military kills. Independent verifications remain challenging amid ongoing hostilities and media restrictions. The first U.S. fatalities occurred on March 1, 2026, when an Iranian drone strike hit a makeshift operations center at the Port of Shuaiba in Kuwait, killing six U.S. Army Reserve soldiers: Maj. Jeffrey O'Brien (45, Waukee, Iowa), Chief Warrant Officer 3 Robert Marzan (54, Sacramento, California), Capt. Cody Khork (35, Winter Haven, Florida), Sgt. 1st Class Nicole Amor (White Bear Lake, Minnesota), Sgt. 1st Class Noah Tietjens, and Sgt. Declan Coady. On March 7, 2026, President Donald Trump attended the dignified transfer of their remains at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. Flag-draped transfer cases were carried by military personnel in a solemn ritual; Trump saluted and met families. The event received media coverage from CNN, AP, Bloomberg, and others, consistent with Department of Defense policies allowing media access to dignified transfers with next-of-kin consent since 2009. Additional deaths included Army Sgt. Benjamin N. Pennington (26, Glendale, Kentucky), who succumbed to injuries from an earlier attack, and six crew members killed in a KC-135 refueling aircraft crash in western Iraq on March 13, 2026. As of July 22, 2026, the US military reported 18 service members killed in the conflict.^[331]

Humanitarian impact

The ongoing war has led to significant civilian displacement and hardships. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran reported on March 11, 2026, that attacks by U.S. and Israeli forces displaced 3.2 million Iranians (primarily from urban centers to northern and rural areas) within the first two weeks of the conflict. United Nations agencies reported nearly 700,000 people displaced across Lebanon in the initial weeks, driven by Israeli evacuation orders and intensified strikes targeting Hezbollah positions; Lebanon's social affairs ministry registered over 517,000.^{[369][370][371]} Eid al-Fitr (coinciding with Nowruz) observances on 20–21 March were markedly subdued in Iran, Lebanon and Gaza because of continued bombardment, displacement and security restrictions.^[372][373] In late March 2026, the head of the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS), Pirhossein Kolivand, reported significant cumulative damage to civilian infrastructure from US-Israeli airstrikes since late February. According to his statements, relayed through outlets such as Anadolu Agency, TASS, Novara Media, and others, over 85,000 to 92,000 civilian structures were affected, including approximately 64,000-71,000 homes, 600 schools (with notable damage in places like Minab), and 281-290 medical facilities (hospitals, clinics, pharmacies). The IRCS also noted damage to 17 of its own branches and various operational vehicles/ambulances. These figures represent Iranian official reporting during the ongoing conflict; as of March 27, 2026, no comprehensive independent verification by UN, Western governments, or neutral observers has confirmed the nationwide aggregates, though specific incidents like the February 28 Minab school strike have received partial corroboration via satellite imagery and investigations. Press freedom has been severely affected. The Committee to Protect Journalists documented the killing of Iranian journalist Masoud Salimi, former director of the Tasnim News Agency bureau in Qom, on March 8, 2026, in a U.S.-Israeli strike on Qom. This was the first reported journalist death since the war began. Additional violations included assaults, threats, harassment of journalists, and damage to media outlets from airstrikes. On-the-ground reporting from Tehran described highly volatile conditions. Special correspondent Reza Sayah reported intense overnight bombardments with jet fighters flying overhead, massive earth-shaking explosions lasting up to 90 minutes, and anti-aircraft fire. Internet blackouts forced reliance on phone communications. Strikes impacted non-military sites, including hospitals, schools, and police headquarters in central areas. Civilians expressed a "sense of despair," desiring a quick end to the war while fearing regime persistence post-conflict. Security forces such as Basij and IRGC dispersed from fixed checkpoints to improvised cover like underpasses to avoid detection. The war has also caused civilian casualties and disruptions in Israel due to ballistic missile and rocket attacks launched by Iran and Hezbollah. Widespread air raid sirens have forced millions of Israelis into bomb shelters for extended periods, disrupting education, employment, and daily routines. On-the-ground reporting from cities like Tel Aviv, Haifa, and northern communities described damaged residential and commercial buildings, overwhelmed hospitals treating casualties, and widespread reports of fear and anxiety among the population. Humanitarian organizations have highlighted increased needs for psychological support, aid to displaced families, and maintenance of essential services amid frequent attacks. In March 2026, as Iranian missile and rocket strikes continued, civilian safety measures intensified in Israel. U.S. Embassy alerts from March 22 to 26 urged sheltering in place and vigilance against missile alerts. Ben Gurion Airport faced strict limits: one departure per hour with ≤50 passengers from March 23, prompting recommendations for overland exits. The U.S. State Department maintained a "Reconsider Travel" advisory, and the UK advised against all travel. These restrictions complicated departures and pilgrimage/tourism access to holy sites, despite some areas remaining operational under tight security. Reports from inside Iran described civilians staying home to avoid airstrikes and encountering checkpoints where security forces searched phones and detained individuals. Anxiety extended beyond bombardment to stress from government actions, prior protests and economic hardship. Public emotions were mixed: alongside fear and worry about the future, death, or losing loved ones, some expressed hope that the strikes might weaken the Islamic Republic, which many resented. Some sentiment was that the current Iranian government posed a long-term threat greater than enduring the military campaign, with concerns that an inconclusive end to the war could lead to intensified repression. Accounts showed jubilation in some quarters alongside guarded hope, anger directed at the Iranian government, and mixed feelings of vindication and despair. Following confirmation of Khamenei's death, some civilians celebrated in the streets of Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz and other cities (including the toppling of a statue in Dehloran), while supporters held mourning gatherings; security forces opened fire on celebrants in some locations.^[374][375] Internet blackouts and reporting restrictions limited independent measurement of how widespread celebration, mourning and anger each were.^[135]

Allegations of international humanitarian law violations

All parties to the conflict face allegations of violations of international humanitarian law. No international court has issued final rulings as of September 2026; investigations by the UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and military authorities are ongoing. A September 2026 report by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission found reasonable grounds to believe the United States committed war crimes in two airstrikes; the same report did not issue equivalent incident-specific findings concerning particular Israeli strikes. These are investigative conclusions, not judicial convictions.^[84][376] Counter-claims from Iranian opposition media (e.g., Iran International, IranWire) and some teachers' unions allege IRGC repurposing of schools, universities, and hospitals for military use (housing personnel, meetings), potentially as human shields, which could affect protected status under Geneva Conventions. Videos and photos show security forces in civilian sites, though regime sources deny systematic militarization. While some strikes targeted military sites near civilian areas, independent groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have called for investigations into proportionality and precautions in attack. In a March 25, 2026, interview on Democracy Now, retired Air Force Master Sergeant Wes Bryant, former chief of the Pentagon’s civilian harm assessment office (2024–2025), criticized the U.S. campaign. Bryant alleged that the dissolution of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response office contributed to inadequate precautions and described the approach as prioritizing lethality over civilian protection. He referenced internal tracking of over 80 potential civilian-incident cases with an estimated 1,800 casualties. These are Bryant’s personal allegations; U.S. officials have not publicly responded in the available reporting, and investigations into specific incidents remain ongoing. U.S. Central Command and Israeli officials have stated that Iran deliberately targeted civilian areas in Israel with ballistic missiles and drones, citing over 300 incidents and verified use of cluster munitions (e.g., Khorramshahr missiles striking Bnei Brak on March 24, 2026). Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have called for independent investigations into possible indiscriminate attacks by Iranian forces and proxies. (Sources: CENTCOM statements; IDF reports; international media coverage, March 2026.) The February 28, 2026, strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab killed 168–175 people according to Iranian state media and officials; the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission and The New York Times cited independent reports of 157 deaths, including around 123 children. Geolocation and fragment analysis by Bellingcat, The New York Times, CNN and Bloomberg confirmed U.S. Navy BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles; two missiles struck the school building and grounds.^[376][377] Preliminary U.S. investigations and reporting on the Pentagon probe attributed the strike to outdated intelligence and imagery that listed the site as an IRGC naval facility, even though the school had been converted, walled off from the compound for years with its own street entrances and visible playgrounds, and operated openly as a civilian institution. The failures were compounded by overreliance on the Project Maven AI targeting system and reductions in civilian-harm mitigation staff; some Pentagon personnel knew the United States was responsible within hours. The United States has not publicly accepted responsibility. Initial U.S. statements attributing it to Iranian forces drew criticism. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission concluded in its September 2026 report that the US directed the strike at the school, whose civilian nature was apparent, while aware of a substantial risk of striking a civilian object, acting recklessly beyond mere negligence, amounting to a possible war crime of indiscriminate attack. A separate US strike the same day on a sports complex in Lamerd, Fars province, killed 22 civilians according to official figures cited in the report, using Precision Strike Missiles that dispersed tungsten pellets over a clearly identifiable sports complex and residential area in a populated area, which the mission also found could constitute a war crime. U.S. Central Command denied conducting the Lamerd strike, stating it launched no attacks in or within 30 miles of the city on 28 February, and the U.S. military did not respond to the commission's requests for information on either incident.^[378][84] No credible reports or evidence indicate that the United States or Israel used chemical, biological, nuclear, or other fully prohibited weapons in strikes on Iran. Iran has used ballistic missiles equipped with cluster warheads against Israeli civilian areas; footage and reporting by The New York Times, CNN, and others document these strikes. Neither the U.S., Israel, nor Iran is a party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Human Rights Watch separately reported Israeli use of white phosphorus in southern Lebanon (March 3, 2026) in a manner that may have violated IHL principles if not employed solely for legitimate military purposes such as smoke screening.